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Abstract 
This study looks at the adaptation and implementation of the E.I.T.I principles in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and assesses whether governance through transparency 
and accountability practices in its extractive sector have improved. It relies on 18 interviews 
with stakeholders implicated in the E.I.T.I implementation, a literature review, and reports 
from various stakeholders. The analysis of data is based on Michel Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality as well as a review of key concepts such as transparency, accountability and 
governance. The study uncovers that a culture of transparency and democratic debate is 
gradually gaining ground, although there is still too much resistance that prevents the E.I.T.I 
from leading to profound changes in policies in the extractive sector. In line with the previous 
studies, the E.I.T.I institutional and operational goals are progressing at the macro level of 
institutions but progress is almost inexistent at the micro-level. It concludes that in the DRC, 
E.I.T.I’s development goals are far from being achieved because all stakeholders do not fully 
understand the standard’s objectives. The study proposes that government sticks to E.I.T.I’s 
guidelines in administrating mining revenue’s, setting clear and measurable targets, 
implementing efficient data collection systems, put together a review system mechanism, and 
set up a punishment/reward mechanism that works. In sum, this study contributes to the field 
of natural resource management by pointing out that internal motivation, internal capacity, 
and external pressure appear to facilitate or limit the success of the global standard in solving 
the resource curse in poor countries that are rich in natural resources. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Transparency initiative (T.I) was created in 2002 to manage “the Resource curse” explained 
by the fact that poor countries particularly rich in natural resources have problems benefiting 
from the extractive sector’s revenues in order to develop their economies (Japhace & George. 
2015). The E.I.T.I global standard is a tool used to promote sustainable development. It 
receives an annual funding of 50 million USD from donors such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (E.I.T.I 2019). Several countries that are rich in oil, gas, and 
mineral resources are alleged to be highly corrupt. According to agencies such as the 
Transparency International, the extractive industries are considered among the most corrupt 
economic sectors worldwide and have been the target of many anti-corruption procedures in 
recent years (David Barrett & Okamura 2013). Transparency initiatives have become an 
important part of the anti-corruption strategy based on the belief that transparency will reduce 
corruption and improve the management of the extractive sector (David-Barrett & Okamura 
2013). As a result, the E.I.T.I requires countries to build multi-stakeholder institutions that 
foster transparency, accountability, and provide qualitative evidence about E.I.T.I 
implementation.  
Through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative hereinafter (E.I.T.I), countries 
dedicate themselves to improve resource governance (Lujala 2017). The initiative addresses 
the failure of social and economic development and the absence of democracy (Mc Gee & 
Gaventa 2010). It is believed that better accountability would fix corruption and 
incompetence, and would create better if not more noticeable positive effects on the lives of 
the communities and a new form of efficient accountability would emerge to include multi-
stakeholders (Mc Gee & Gaventa 2010); something E.I.T.I., through its global standard, 
attempts to offer its members. It proposes transparency measure that cover the extractive 
sector’s value chain
1
. The global standard is supported by members of the civil society, 
mining corporations and associated agents and governments who meet around a common 
framework to discuss overcoming aspects of the resource curse related to inequality, social 
stagnation, conflicts, autocratic political regimes, corruption, bad governance, and failed 
taxation systems (Japhace & George 2015).  
                                                 
1
 What the value chain steps cover: 1. Legal framework 2. distribution of licenses and contracts 3. Exploration and production 4. Revenue 
collection 5. revenue allocation 6.the social and economic spending (E.I.T.I. 2020) 
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According to Rustad et al (2017), the E.I.T.I has 12 specific goals subdivided into three 
categories:  
1. Institutional goals are about making the E.I.T.I as an organization legally recognized 
as a global norm for the extractive industry and to put in place multi-stakeholders 
groups (MSGs) that inspire its sound management (ibid.). 
2. Operational goals are about the E.I.T.I’s outputs and outcomes such as publishing 
annual national reports, increasing public debate commitment in resource governance 
and make sure that the civil society’s contribution is ensured by national MSGs (ibid.). 
3. Developmental goals are about reducing corruption, accruing state revenues from the 
extractive sector, promoting sound governance, and stimulating social and economic 
progress (ibid.).  
The field of transparency initiatives is growing and diverges in scales and goals especially 
with the support of donors. However, not much thought has been given to the impact and 
usefulness of new-fangled transparency and accountability initiatives (Mc Gee & Gaventa 
2010). Rustad et al (2017) and Lujala (2010) have studied the successes of E.I.T.I.’s 
initiatives and have looked at factors that motivate countries to join the E.I.T.I. Other scholars 
have looked at the E.I.T.I.’s weak impact on the governance of natural resources value chain 
(see Mawejje (2019) or  Sovacool & Andrews (2015). Lujala (2008) for example showed that 
researchers have managed to single out factors that influence the effectiveness of the E.I.T.I. 
He categorized them as internal motivation, internal capacity, and external pressure to 
implement the global standard. Miller and Rose (2008) have examined governments’ 
programmes and the technologies used to promote the economies. They viewed government 
programmes as the political rationalities of government actors and the technologies of 
government as different set of techniques and practices organized to carry government 
programmes (Miller 2001). In our case, the E.I.T.I reflects elements of the technology of 
government in a toolbox that is aimed at ensuring economic growth and social equity in a 
multi-stakeholder paradigm.  
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the second-largest Sub-Saharan African country 
with approximately 89 369 742 inhabitants and 54% of its population living in rural areas 
(World Bank 2020). The country possesses an estimated wealth of 24 trillion U.S. dollars in 
untapped mineral deposits. It owns the world’s largest reserves of coltan and significant 
quantities of the world’s cobalt (IMF 2018). The country is finally moving on after decades of 
violent armed conflicts, but it remains a weak post-conflict state with a massive need to 
rebuild itself in order to overcome present and future challenges (Karsenty, 2007). The 
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country’s extractive sector has grown since 2002 and has contributed highly to the national 
economy (E.I.T.I 2019). However, the governance of its natural resources due to poor 
leadership, illegal exports of natural resources, tax evasion and weak institutions remains a 
key issue
2
 (Transparency Initiative, 2010). If one is to believe the promising prospects of the 
global standard
3
, the DRC should be able to solve many of its challenges in urban as well as 
rural areas. A stable political system and good governance, with secure property rights for 
local communities and sound investments, can stimulate sustainable development and 
empower the Congolese people to profit from its wealth (Samndong & Nhantumbo 2015), 
thus clearing the resource curse. 
1.1.1 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
The E.I.T.I is a global alliance of governments, industries and civil society organizations that 
seek to improve governance and accountability for everyone in the management of oil, gas 
and minerals for the benefit of the citizens of countries rich in natural resources (E.I.T.I 2020; 
Poncian & Kigodi 2018; Wilson & Van Alstine 2014). It was founded in June 2002 when six 
London-based civil organizations gathered around the Publish What You Pay campaign
4
 and 
challenged the extractive industries to publish their payments (revenues) to host governments 
and enhance extractive sector management (E.I.T.I 2020). Global Witness, Open Society 
Foundation, OXFAM, Save the Children Transparency International and Catholic Agency for 
Overseas Development (CAFOD) that are E.I.T.I’s founding members (PWYP, 2020). They 
discovered that the states rich in natural resources were going through a set of economic and 
socio-political problems. They joined forces to influence the global industry’s main players in 
adjusting policies and practices in the industries and in governments (E.I.T.I 2020). They 
were persuaded that the declaration of oil, gas or mining revenues would lead nations to hold 
their leaders accountable for the management of dividends generated by the extraction of 
natural resources (Poncian & Kigodi, 2018; E.I.T.I, 2020). As a rule, E.I.T.I, requests that 
extractive companies disclose what they pay to the state and that the latter discloses all 
revenues from taxation, fees and royalties paid by private or state-owned companies into the 
national Treasury (Poncian & Kigodi 2018; E.I.T.I 2020). 
The government, extractive companies and civil societies are organized around a tripartite 
group whose function is to guarantee the effective implementation E.I.T.I standards and to 
                                                 
2 Seventy-two percent of its population lives in severe poverty on less than two dollars a day, especially in the rural area (World Bank 2018). 
The paradox of plenty seems to be a permanent shadow planning over the land 
3
 The E.I.T.I. views the resource of a country as belonging to its people for the purpose to create social and economic welfare (E.I.T.I. 2020), 
4 “Is the worldwide campaign for an open and accountable extractive industry”. https://www.pwyp.org/ [2020-08-16] 
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encourage public debates on the government spending of revenues generated from the 
industry (E.I.T.I 2020). Disclosed revenues are settled by the Independent Administrator hired 
by the Executive Committee and published in an E.I.T.I report (E.I.T.I 2020). This 
mechanism allows citizens to view the impact of their natural resources on the national 
economy, to assess the management of resources and revenues, to hold governments 
accountable (Gupta 2010; Poncian & Kigodi 2018; E.I.T.I 2020). The E.I.T.I also requires 
collaboration between the government, extractive companies and civil societies, thus forcing 
the state in increasing transparency to meet budgets (Poncian & Kigodi 2018; E.I.T.I 2020). 
The ultimate goals of the E.I.T.I are poverty reduction, economic growth and sustainable 
development (Aaronson 2011; Independent Evaluation Group 2011; Papyrakis, Rieger, and 
Gilberthorpe 2016; Wilson and Van Alstine2014; see Poncian & Kigodi 2018). The goal of its 
global standard is to increase transparency over the revenues from a country's oil, gas and 
mineral resources (E.I.T.I 2020). This aim has evolved since 2002 and its execution is 
supervised by a multi-stakeholder board of directors constitute of representatives of 
governments, active companies in the extractive sector, civil society organizations, 
institutional investors and international organizations at international and local level (E.I.T.I 
2020) 
1.1.2. Extractive sector in the DRC 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is divided into 26 provinces. The Upper 
Katanga is one of the mining provinces this paper focuses on. It possesses more than 15% of 
the world's copper reserves and more than 50% of the cobalt reserves, with grades 
significantly higher than those of other producing countries (Ngoy 2003). The Upper Katanga 
province is situated in the South-East of the country. It is marked by the presence of several 
mining companies mostly extracting copper and cobalt (E.I.T.I 2019). The DRC is the 
world’s fourth largest producer of copper and supplies 55% of the world cobalt production 
(E.I.T.I 2019) and it is among the top 15 gold producers in the world. It is also the world’s 
largest producer of industrial diamond (E.I.T.I 2019). Indeed, since independence the mining 
sector in the DRC has been generating substantial income for the country GDP (E.I.T.I 2020). 
Figure 1 below offers us a layout of the DRC’s mineral wealth. 
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Figure 1: Map of minerals in the DRC Source: 
http://www.pagewebcongo.com/actions.php?a=dbo_articles&rid=45&lang=en 
The DRC’s economy deteriorated during the 1990s because of repeated armed conflicts that 
claimed the lives of 3 million people (OECD 2005). Human development indicators such as 
malnutrition, life expectancy and literacy were destabilized severely according to the OECD 
(2005). Peace was reinstated in 2001 in some areas although conflicts continued in the eastern 
part of the country (ibid.). During that period the government presented a policy of economic 
stabilisation with some financing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. The DRC secured a credit of 1.2 billion dollars in order for its new economic 
programme (OECD 2005) that ran from April 2002 to July 2005 and grew the economy from 
3.5% in 2002 to 5.7% in 2003 (OECDD 2005). The programme’s objectives were to ease up 
prices and trade issues, to restructure the banking sector, and to exploit growth possibilities 
(ibid.). The DRC’s economy grew to 7 per cent in 2005 and 2006 thanks to the national 
recovery and foreign investments according to OEDC (2004/2005). However, the country 
remains one of the poorest in the world with a human development indicator of .0,459 in 
2018, which is one of the lowest in the world (UNDP, 2018). 
The legal framework imposed on the mining sector was a crucial decision the DRC made 
after the armed conflicts of the 1990s. Outdated mining legislations were revamped with the 
2002 mining code (loi no 007/2002) and resulted in an increase of foreign direct investments 
and a steady growth in copper production (NRGI 2018), but the mining code of 2002 was 
seen as being very liberal. Existing factors such as poor governance of the mining sector, 
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illegal exports or tax evasion explained why natural resources did not benefit the majority of 
the Congolese population and the development of the country (Smyth 2019). The DRC 
situation as a poor but rich-resources country raised an important question: would the natural 
resources stand for a blessing that enhance the socio-economic situation of the country or 
would it continue to be a curse as discussed by Collier et al. (2009)? rather a source of 
conflict and civil war (Gelb 1988; Sachs and Warner 1999; Gylfason 2011; Venables 2016). 
Perhaps this could be the reason why the DRC joined the E.I.T.I and pledge to adopt its 
procedures.  
1.1.3 Governance challenges 
This section explores the claims civil societies groups made about extractive sector 
governance in the DRC. It discusses illegal and artisanal mining, corruption, contractual 
agreements between parties, trust as an issue that plagues management, the perception of the 
institution and lastly indigenous communities’ rights.  
1.1.3.1 Illegal artisanal mining 
Unlawful high-quality mining is a serious problem for resource-rich poor countries (World 
Bank 2006). These activities spoil extractive areas and make soil less manageable, causing the 
loss of income to the state. The World Bank argues that such a climate does not help the 
administration and adds to the development of destitution and social clashes (World Bank 
2006). In January 2014, a UN gathering of specialists assessed the amount of loss in gold 
revenue in the RDC. They concluded that 98% of gold mined in the DRC with an estimation 
of $383 to $409 million was smuggled out of the country and/or linked to tax evasion, 
resulting in loss of revenues to the government (BTTI, 2018). This loss reflects the 
weaknesses of the mining codes, the institutions, and the ability to enforce existing codes  
1.1.3.2 Corruption 
Corruption is for the most part seen as the mistreatment of endowed force for private gain 
(FAO 2001; Korwin 2016). There can be economic corruption which includes the trading of 
brides in the form of money, official positions, material products, etc. Social corruption 
mostly includes trading non-physical things, for example, favours, economic wellbeing or the 
use of force to influence the outcome of a deal (FAO, 2001; Korwin, 2016). In the DRC’s 
extractive sector, the lack of proper public tracking in the granting of licenses and concessions 
is a source for corruption; so is the lack of both accountability and transparency in contracts; 
the trading of political influence; nonconformity with procedures and legal requirements; 
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inadequate consultations with property-owners and the civil society; as well as the inadequate 
corporate accountability due to opaque chains of contracting and the lack of annual financial 
reports. 
1.1.3.3 Unclear contract 
The principles of natural resource management are legally represented in the RDC’s 
Constitution of February 18, 2006 and amended by Law No. 11/002 January 20, 2014 (E.I.T.I 
2019). Indeed, article 9 of the Constitution stipulates that “The State exercises permanent 
sovereignty notably over the soils, the underground, the waters and the forests, over 
Congolese air, rivers, lakes and maritime spaces as well as over the Congolese territorial sea 
and on the continental shelf”. The State, through the Central Government, has the exclusive 
competence to legislate in the economic sphere by promulgating the laws on mining minerals 
and mineral oils; the laws industry, energy sources and the conservation of natural resources
5
 
(E.I.T.I/DRC 2018). Mining licenses or research exploitation licenses are granted by the 
office responsible for registering mining lands, the Cadastre Minier (CAMI). Whoever has a 
license can sign the exploitation that is regulated by the national mining code with the State. 
The national mining code determines the rules of exploitation of sovereign assets such as the 
minerals while the contract only stipulates the terms agreed upon by government between two 
stakeholders, one being a representative of the state and the other a foreign company. Actors 
can obtain an exploration licence without having financial capacity to exploit the deposit. The 
holder of a license who is unable to develop the mine or does not have enough resources 
(technical, financial) could seek out a foreign partner. The state is the public administrator 
through CAMI and the Congolese tax administration although the Ministry of finance may 
request to review any contract with a private actor. Because the DRC has not efficient tools to 
value their mineral deposits contractors can take advantage of the government’s the lack of 
information and sign contracts that are not in best interest of the country. 
1.1.3.4 Unreliability of the extractive sector’s management plans 
Extractive sector’s management plans in the DRC are not systematically developed. 
According to E.I.T.I (2008) this is not unique to the DRC since developing countries lack 
access to consistent mining production, exportation, employment data. They also lack the 
proper methodologies to get relevant and trustworthy information (E.I.T.I, 2018). The manner 
in which governments collect, use and evaluate information about their mineral resources give 
insights to policy priorities or biases, incomplete and often deficiency of information. The 
                                                 
5
 DRC Constitution article 202, point 36, litera f (E.I.T.I 2019). 
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E.I.T.I lists institutions that have statistics on mining productions and exports. There are four 
such organisations active in the DRC (INS, OCC, Central Bank, INSS.). When cross 
analysing their respective data it is not uncommon to receive contradictory information that 
does not facilitate the implementation of management plans. Additionally, mining 
management plans do recognize the stake of local communities and the civil society in the 
maintenance and use of biodiversity. Yet, their roles need to be acknowledged as we will see 
later on, large communities in Kipushi, Tenke Fungurume, Kolwezi and Ruashi who had their 
biodiversity destroyed by the mining activities. This information is not clearly represented in 
official plans regarding the affected areas where a majority of people still live. 
1.1.3.5 Lack of coordination by institutions 
The extractive industries’ value chain recognizes five important steps in coordinating natural 
resource management: the granting of licenses / access to resources, the exploitation, revenue 
collection, revenue allocation and the outcomes. Each step requires the involvement of a 
specific institution or agency in sustainably managing natural resources within a country. 
However, the lack in collaborations and transparency in sharing information weakens the 
institutions and the country cannot prosper from its resources. In the DRC, as the Cadastre 
Minier (CAMI) grants licenses to exploit the deposits it also activates several other 
institutions in various stages of exploitation. For example, sub-institutions such as DGI, 
DGDA, DGRAD that intervene in collecting revenues. However, collaboration between these 
institutions is asynchronous and inefficient. Institutions that are implicated in the 
administration of the mines do not collaborate well with the DGI. When a mining operator 
makes its declaration the DGI lacks the tools to verify exactly what the operator has declared 
etc. 
Collecting and safekeeping data from operations are important to all stakeholders but 
archiving is not effective in the DRC. A system that would stock data and information 
regarding the production and the exportation of extractive resources does not exist in the 
RDC, and this makes difficult the possibility of a follow up. Before the 2002 mining code 
reform the mining sector was managed only by the state. After the mining reform the country 
experienced a change from being a monopoly in managing the extractive sector towards 
including multiple actors, thus creating a highly fragmented ecosystem. A multiplicity of 
actors and the state have hard time coordinating everything. Whenever there has been a legal 
mining reform in the Congo institutional reforms have not always followed the change 
because of a power struggle between institutions. There are four to five institutions that 
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control the information about mining production, exportation and employment; information 
that are often contradictory in nature. 
1.1.3.6 Violation of local community people’s rights 
The CIVICUS Monitor, online tools that tracks and compare civic freedom worldwide 
presents data from May 2017, showing that the space for common society - community space 
- is presently genuinely limited in 38 of 51 E.I.T.I nations (CIVICUS, date). This means that 
local communities' privileges and rights to organize, to stand up and to participate in local 
development are systematically violated by many of governments that have implemented 
E.I.T.I. Civic society organizations (CS0s) and human rights groups in most E.I.T.I nations 
face serious obstacles including dangers to their own security, refusal of the option to dissent, 
denial to conduct observation and repression. The Violation of Communities’ rights in the 
E.I.T.I countries, specifically the DRC is very disturbing, given that the E.I.T.I seeks to 
promote accountability by government to all citizens and to explicitly recognize the 
importance and contribution of the CSOs. The degree of limitations uncovered by the 
CIVICUS report challenges the suitability of the E.I.T.I. It brings up major issues and raises 
serious questions about E.I.T.I states failing to protect CSOs and viewing them as foes instead 
of as partners in development sound governance and accountability. Perhaps, the E.I.T.I ought 
to perform an introspection on its functioning and the implementation of its standard; perhaps 
it ought to pay more attention to CSOs and activists’ complaints and incorporate some of the 
solutions they propose in its framework (Counsell, 2009; Global Witness, 2017). 
1.1.4 Transparency initiatives in the DRC (Brief history). 
1.4.1.1 The initial phase 
After the E.I.T.I.’s second International Conference of London in March 2005, the DRC 
organized an international discussion in Kinshasa with the World Bank (W.B) and the 
Department for International Development (DFID). The goal of the gathering was to think 
about a way toward implementing E.I.T.I in the country (Kiangu 2018). The forum invited 
different industry stakeholders active within the DRC’s extractive sector, i.e. national and 
international mining companies, national or international NGOs, offices of the United Nations 
framework, international financial institutions, collaboration organizations, etc. (Kiangu 
2018). 
This happened after United Nations produced a report on the smuggling of natural resources 
out of country (Kiangu 2018). The gathering resulted in a system called the Centre national 
d’appuis au development et a la participation populaire or CENADEP that was created under 
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the impulse of Hamuli Baudouin, its first General Manager (Kiangu 2018). CENADEP’s role 
at the time was to develop a powerful and dynamic cooperation with Congolese civil society 
associations (Kiangu 2018). Civil society groups have been involved with right issues in the 
DRC’s extractive industry since 2002 (E.I.T.I 2019). This collaboration was further boosted 
by the Publish What You Pay International Coalition (Kiangu 2018).  
Additional gatherings were organized to launch the E.I.T.I in the DRC.
6,7,8
 They resulted in 
building up an administrative system for the implementation of the E.I.T.I. A report was 
published in order to provide guidance and focus in the administration of the E.I.T.I standards 
as far as selected natural resources were concerned, i.e. copper, cobalt, and related metals 
(E.I.T.I 2019; Kiangu 2018). In spite all good efforts, the project of fully implementing 
E.I.T.I/DRC came to a halt due to the national election periods of 2007 and 2008 that took 
precedent over everything else (Kiangu 2018). The fully and legally operational E.I.T.I-DRC 
exists since 2009
9
 (E.I.T.I 2016; Kiangu 2018). As described in figure 2 below, the DRC join 
the E.I.T.I in 2005 and went through several stages. The DRC is a full member of the E.I.T.I 
since 2019 (E.I.T.I, 2019). 
1.1.4.2 DRC E.I.T.I development of a legal framework (2005-2016) 
E.I.T.I/DRC has published 11 reports since it was implemented. The technical secretariat in 
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi ensure the timely execution of the reports (E.I.T.I 2020). The 
board of executive members and the national coordinator are designated by decree and are 
represented by the multi-stakeholders group made of the Ministry of Planning, the Ministries 
of Mines, Hydrocarbons, Environment and Finance (E.I.T.I 2020). However, the DRC's 
Candidate status was in temporarily suspended on 18 April 2013, after the publication of the 
2010 report by the E.I.T.I. The DRC was found not to meet E.I.T.I.’s requirements and the 
country has since corrected the issues that caused its suspension (E.I.T.I 2019). E.I.T.I 
implementation had an impact on the quality of reforms in the extractive sector.  It allowed 
the country to integrate the global standard requirements when passing laws that have an 
                                                 
6
 On November 18, 2005, the President of the Republic H.E. Joseph Kabila Kabange issued a decree No. 05/160 establishing the National 
Committee of the Initiative on Transparency in the Management of Income from Extractive Industries in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(E.I.T.I/DRC). see figure  2 
7 On May 3, 2006 Order No. 001/CAB.MIN/PL/2006 of the DRC’s Minister of Planning, publicly appointed a Chairman of the E.I.T.I-
DRC’s steering committee which designed the partner structures and nominated individuals to the E.I.T.I-DRC Technical Committee that 
was completed on June 12 to 13, 2006 (E.I.T.I 2016, Kiangu 2018). 
8 On September 19, 2006, the Technical Committee of E.I.T.I/DRC commissioned an initial study of the mining sector (E.I.T.I 2019, Kiangu 
2018). 
9 as indicated by decree n ° 09/27 of July 16, 2009, organizing and operating the National Committee of the Initiative for Transparency in the 
administration of the extractive businesses in the Democratic Republic of Congo, CN-E.I.T.I/DRC in abbreviation (E.I.T.I 2016; Kiangu 
2018). 
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impact on the stakeholders
10
.  The E.I.T.I/DRC’s execution plan for the 2018-2020 states that 
the complete objective of E.I.T.I implementation is to enhance sustainable development 
within the country. By implementing transparency for the governance of its natural resources, 
the DRC is hoping to improve the populations’ the standard of living while securing a better 
future for generations to come (E.I.T.I 2020).  
 
Figure 2: DRC’s E.I.T.I membership and implementation progress Source: 
https://EITI.org/files/inline/drc_timeline_feb_2019_1.jpg 
1.1.4.3 DRC Revenue collection and revenue allocation 
The E.I.T.I.’s reconciliation report of 2006 showed the income that the DRC received from 
the extractive sector (see figure 3), with $ 756 million or 67% of the whole profits deposited 
into the national bank account (E.I.T.I 2020). Article 175 of the DRC’s constitution mandates 
that 40% of the national income be assigned to the province (E.I.T.I 2020) and article 242 of 
the Mining code directs owners of mining exploitation titles to  deposit royalties into  the 
state’s national bank account (E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). The distribution of revenues is as follows: 
60% are to be retained by the central government; 25% are to be transferred to an account 
chosen by the provincial administration where mining occurred; 15% of the revenue are to be 
transferred to an account chosen by the city or the zone where the  activity is taking place; and 
15% are to be relocated to decentralised local entities (E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). However, findings 
                                                 
10
 Decrees such as No. 05/160 of November 18, 2005 on the creation, organization and operation of the National Committee of the Initiative 
for Transparency in the Management of Extractive Industries in the Democratic Republic of Congo, "CNITIE / DRC" or No. 0186 of 2012 
obligating companies to declare income were signed in order to improve accountability and transparency in the extractive sector (E.I.T.I 
2019). 
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revealed that revenues were seldom distributed in agreement with the agreed upon sharing 
mechanism (E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). Civil society pushed for more transparency regarding the 
sharing mechanism and in 2018, the mining code was modified in favour of direct payments 
from companies to local entities (E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). 
 
 
Figure 3: DRC’s effort to increase transparency Source: https://EITI.org/democratic-
republic-of-congo. 
 
1.1 Aims and Research Questions 
The six internationally approved conditions that describe the result of a successful EITI 
process can be found on the organizations website
11
. They are also mentioned in Chapter 2, 
EITI Rules (2011). Yet there remains an evidence gap with regards to the mechanisms linking 
E.I.T.I adoption and development outcomes with respect to the communities living around the 
extractive industry’s sites. This study is therefore interested by this specific development 
outcomes gap in the context of the DRC it addresses with the following research questions: 
1. Has the E.I.T.I been successful over the years of implementation? 
2. What opportunities and challenges does E.I.T.I face when it comes to improving 
extractive sector management?  
3. How do communities living around extractive industries secure their livelihood and 
how do they experience the impact of E.I.T.I?  
In sum, these three research questions demand we answer the ultimate question of whether all 
stakeholders see the E.I.T.I success in the same way, based on the information they have at 
hand.  
                                                 
11
 http://eiti.org/eiti/ principles 
20 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
This study is arranged as follow see figure 4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Thesis outline 
The first section is the introduction. It provides the background of the study; the history and 
circumstances that allowed from the creation of EITI and for the DRC to join the organisation 
and to implement the initiative. At the end of the introduction we state the problem in 
discussion and the aim of our study. In the second part we proceed with a review of the 
literature on EITI implementation. We follow with a third section that introduces the key 
concepts and the theory that underpin our study: governmentality, transparency, 
accountability and governance. In the fourth section we proceed with explaining our 
methodology, meaning our collection of data and our reasoning with the subject matter of the 
thesis. In section five we present the data in discussion. We study these data in section 6 in 
light of sections 3 and 4. Section 7 focuses on a discussion of our findings before we conclude 
our work and offer some recommendation about improving the view of EITI in the DRC in 
section 8. 
2 Literature overview 
2.1 Achievement of the E.I.T.I 
The E.I.T.I currently has 53 members; a number that reflects the adequacy and interest of the 
global standard E.I.T.I proposes to its stakeholders (E.I.T.I 2020). A great deal of the 
discussion about the achievement of the initiative is built around its main believes and 
objectives (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). One such objective is to help resource rich countries in 
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defeating predatory economic practices that harm the populations by gaining control of a 
country’s assets and revenues that should benefit all (Poncian & Kigodi). The initiative has 
been used as a governance tool in reducing corruption and improving transparency and 
accountability (David-Barrett and Okamura 2013; Papyrakis, Rieger, and Gilberthorpe 2016; 
see Poncian & Kigodi 2018). There are studies that point out to the failure of the initiative in 
fighting corruption; see Öge(2016), Corrigan(2014), or Poncian & Kigodi(2018) who 
mentioned such studies. For Example, Barr and Aniche (2013), cited in Poncian & 
Kigodi(2018), argued that Nigeria implementing the initiative did not eliminate the culture of 
impunity and corruption. Studies that report the positive impacts of implementing the E.I.T.I 
in order to reduce corruption in country rich in natural resources are limited.  Nonetheless the 
E.I.T.I compeles government to publish information related to its extractive sector (David-
Barrett and Okamura 2013; Öge 2016; Sovacool and Andrews 2015; see Poncian & Kigodi 
2018) and to give the local communities access to critical information essential to their 
welfare thereby making it difficult for government to exercise the rentier politic (Pontian & 
Kigodi 2018).  
In sum, the E.I.T.I appears to offer useful tools for the effective management and governance 
of natural resources (Lehmann 2015; Sovacool et al. 2016; Pontian & Kigodi 2018). The 
initiative focuses on transparency issues along the extractive industries value chain 
(production to exportation) (Sovacool et al 2016) and does not limit its activities solely to the 
disclosure of information connected to the extractive sector. It endeavours to show how 
generated income is used to improve the socio-economic aspects of the country (Poncian & 
Kigodi 2018) through a local deliberation with host communities (Shaxson 2008; Sovacool et 
al. 201), and it makes it possible for government and local communities to engage in 
discussions regarding governance and transparency (Aaronson 2011). But Sovacool and 
Andrews (2015) argue that it is very challenging to reconcile progress in the governance of 
the extractive sector with the E.I.T.I’s implementation (ambitions);  although, this way not be 
the case of Tanzania where progress was made in the governance of its extractive sector by 
implementing the E.I.T.I (Poncian & Kigodi 2018). 
2.2 Critics of E.I.T.I in the literature 
The successful implementation of E.I.T.I has been met by mixed reviews. Aaronson (2011) 
points out some limitations and posits that the E.I.T.I partnership was unsuccessful because 
stakeholders (governments, civil society, and businesses) have different understandings of 
E.I.T.I. In some cases, countries members implementing the global standard have not allowed 
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the civil society to be involved in the process and have denied them access to the information 
they need to claim their rights on the natural resource management. In Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan for example, Öge (2017) found out that the civil society was not involved in the 
decision-making process as required by the global standard because of political, technical, 
financial and bureaucratic limitations within the country. Öge (2016) also analysed the impact 
of E.I.T.I membership on transparency and corruption in 46 countries and showed that the 
global standard has a significant impact on helping the country to disclose information on 
natural resource management. However, how transparency can impact corruption is still 
unclear. 
Studies about the impact the E.I.T.I’s implementation on targeted outcomes tend to focus on 
the way countries view or approach transparency. A small set of studies find that the E.I.T.I 
can be effective in its interactions with the governments if presented as a tool to prevent 
corruption and enhance transparency (Ravat & Kannan, 2012; Malden, 2017). Another set of 
studies examines institutionally structured and purposeful efforts to help countries engage in 
E.I.T.I in the form of both policies and politics to allow them to be accountable (Öge, 2016; 
Aaronson, 2011). Öge (2016) argued that E.I.T.I has become the policy of choice for 
countries with questionable natural resources governance. Klein (2017) claimed that 
stakeholders view the global standard as a tool for managing natural resources and providing 
transparency. Malden (2017) found out that countries implementing the global standard attract 
investments in the mining sector because E.I.T.I implementation can offer multinational 
mining companies the government's commitment to maintain a stable and transparent 
operating atmosphere. Rustad, Billon, & Lujala, (2017) put the global standard goals into 
categories: institutional, operational and development. They found out that the E.I.T.I 
institutional and operational goals are most successful compared to the latter. Institutional 
goals create a brand and make transparency into a global norm. The operational goals putting 
together safeties such as standards for auditing, reporting, and civil society participation in 
multi-stakeholder groups (Rustad, Billon, & Lujala, (2017). 
Hilson & Maconachie (2008) argued that the E.I.T.I is been promoted in Western 
policymaking spheres as a mechanism that enables natural resources management "through 
the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, 
gas, and mining" (E.I.T.I 2007). According to E.I.T.I (2007), such transparency might be the 
strategy to develop country integrity, especially among donors and investors. However, the 
study concludes that the E.I.T.I is incapable of reducing corruption, especially in extractive 
industries. 
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In 2008, the World Bank published a report entitled "Implementation Lessons Learned: 
E.I.T.I Policy Implications." The report recounts the experiences of countries that have 
implemented the E.I.T.I between 2004 and 2007(World Bank Group, 2008). It also serves as a 
practical guide to stakeholders by providing examples of good practices (ibid.). Improvement 
in E.I.T.I guidelines and procedures were significant and became the established global 
standard actively implemented by many countries (Ravat & Kannan 2012); a level of 
acceptance that leads us to explore the implementation and the impact of the E.I.T.I in 
countries with questionable governance of natural resources. Many factors can influence the 
choices of implementing the E.I.T.I in a natural resources rich country, such as internal 
motivation (corruption), internal capacity (quality of institutions), and external pressure (aid 
and development assistance) to implement the Standard (Lujala 2018). Only a few studies 
have specifically examined whether the E.I.T.I’s end goals are factors influencing Sub-
Saharan African countries to implement the global standard; whether the integration of the 
E.I.T.I in policy and politics is a condition to better governance, such as in the case of the 
DRC. 
Since 2007, the governance of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo has 
been managed by following the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (E.I.T.I 2019). 
The country has published yearly financial reports showing a steady increase in government 
revenues (E.I.T.I 2019). However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2019) questioned 
the latest E.I.T.I. report from the DRC because of the divergence between tax revenues paid 
by extractive industries and what the government received (IMF, 2019).The IMF also argued 
that the disclosure of payments made by extractive industries and revenues received by the 
government could help enhance transparency. However, not much was shown in the report 
leading the IMF to question whether the government was receiving a fair share of the 
revenues from the exploitation of natural resources (IMF, 2019). In October 2019 the E.I.T.I 
Boards published an article about the DRC making significant improvement in executing the 
E.I.T.I global standard. Yet the E.I.T.I board was still concerned about the persistence of 
corruption and mismanagement of resources in the country’s extractive sector (E.I.T.I, 2019). 
This begs for a closer look at key concepts that guide our investigation of perception of the 
impact of the standard in the RDC. 
3. Theory and key concepts 
Accountability, Transparency and governance as components of governmentality: 
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These past decades, transparency, accountability, ethical governance mechanisms turn out to 
be embodied within corporate life especially in the developing world (Spence & Rinaldi 2014, 
Katomero 2017). These mechanisms have been influenced by stakeholders’ concerns, 
institutional pressures and legality issues because they all consist of the drive for democracy 
and good governance (Hoffman, 1999, O’Dwyer, 2003, Katomero xxxx). In this section, the 
concept of transparency, accountability and good governance are interpreted within a 
governmentality framework 
3.1 Governmentality 
This study uses governmentality as the overall theoretical framework to illuminate and to 
analyze transparency, accountability, and governance practices in the context of the DRC 
implementing the global standard E.I.T.I in the extractive sector. 
To cite Abdullah and Khadaroo (2016), Foucault’s governmentality is: 
“the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this 
very specific, albeit very complex, power...that we all call 
‘government’ and which has led to the development of a series of 
specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, 
on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges 
(savoirs)”(Foucault, 2007, p.108) 
 
Governmentality was spearheaded by Michel Foucault in the 1970 when analyzing the 
concept of political power (Rose et al 2006). Another way to comprehend governmentality is 
“how we think about governing with different rationalities, mentalities and technologies” as 
they are linked to governing (Miller and Rose 1990 cited in Dean 2010:24). Dean (2009) 
describes governmentality as a form of power concerned with the conduct of conduct. To the 
author, it is more or less a calculated and rational activity (a way of reasoning to respond to a 
problem); agreed by stakeholders using different techniques and forms of knowledge with the 
aim to shape citizens’ behavior. It includes techniques and strategies by which a society is 
rendered governable such as laws, transparency initiatives, etc. (Foucault 2002 in Miller 
1990). Rationality according to Dean (2010) is therefore linked to moral questions and it is 
comprehended here as a way influence stakeholders within the extractive sector in the DRC 
through the practice of transparency and accountability for the good governance of natural 
resources. The rational attempt to influence the conduct of stakeholders becomes an important 
feature of government (Katomero 2017). Thus, government’s rationality in terms of morality 
is to put in place good and responsible policies and practices at the national and local levels, 
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using specific forms of knowledge in implementation of transparency, accountability and 
sound governance (Dean, 2010). 
The government decides on control techniques related to the self and citizens (Foucault 2002). 
E.I.T.I can be seen as a rationality choice used to govern the extractive sector and monitor the 
government’s practices vis-à-vis the industry. There is an emerging debate in political and a 
social science that focuses on changes connected to E.I.T.I’s relations to a nation’s social 
matters in the large common sense (Lujala 2018). In this regard, E.I.T.I emerged as the global 
standard for the good management for oil, gas and mineral resources and transparency, 
accountability and good governance could be viewed as dispositive for the success of its 
implementation (Lujala 2018). Miller and Rose (2008) argued on the matter of 
governmentality and differentiate between the programs of government and the technologies 
of government. The programs of government are the political rationalities of government 
authorities putting together ideas, conceiving projects and policy requirement for 
governments (Miller & Rose 2008). The programs of government are the methods by which 
government bodies seek to build and influence life (ibid.). In our case, the global standard 
E.I.T.I is such a programme deployed to improve the governance of the extractive sector and 
to contribute to the sustainable development of poor countries rich in natural resources. The 
technologies of government are techniques and procedures through which different 
government actors seek to implement the conceived programmes (Miller & Rose 2008). 
These two concepts, technologies and programmes of governments are interconnected (Miller 
2001). It is through the technologies of government that the political rationalities and the 
programmes of government that expressed them are implemented (Burchell, Gordon, and 
Miller 1991). 
The problematics of government are analyzed in different ways as pointed by Miller and Rose 
(2008); mostly in terms of their political rationalities such as seen fit by the ruling classes for 
the exercise of power. Miller and Rose (2008) suggested to study the problematics of 
government in terms of governmental technologies, the complex of initiatives, calculations, 
techniques, tools, documents and measures through which the ruling classes seek to express 
and carry out in practice to execute their ambitions. The DRC has joined the E.I.T.I since 
2005 and has since managed the extractive sector according to the E.I.T.I’s requirements. 
Based on Miller and Rose (2008), to detect the problematic of the government, the study will 
have to explore reasons behind the government’s decision to join the E.I.T.I and measure if 
the decision was to enhance the social-economic aspect of the country or the action was just a 
strategy to control the sector and the citizens.  
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According to Foucault (1984) Governmentality deals with more than to discipline and to trap 
individuals through different strategies (i.e. apparatuses of power). It also manipulates 
individuals and become a tool for government manipulation (Abdullah & Khadaroo 2016). 
Townley (1993) in Abdullah & Khadaroo (2016) argue that governmentality processes, aim to 
shape and reshape individuals or institutions into obedient entities. They also coerce 
individuals or institutions to observe and analyze their own conduct (Foucault, 1984). In our 
case, the efficient way to implement the E.I.T.I is to practice transparency, accountability and 
good governance in the management of the extractive sector. In following section, we explore 
how the concept of transparency accords itself with Foucault’s governmentality.  
3.2 Transparency 
According to Bellver and Kaufman (2005) there is not yet a well-defined meaning for 
transparency. They argue that transparency is a wide idea that has been the main focus of 
numerous researchers. Han 2005) believes that transparency is a neoliberal mechanism that is 
more concerned about the programme of government Nowadays, to produce efficiently 
depends on the communication of available information (Han 2015). However, confidentiality 
or secrecy on the other hand hinders productivity but transparency dismantled secrecy issues 
Han (2015). The idea of transparency has been identified with resident's entitlement to know 
and access to data (Bellver & Kaufman 2005). We live is a new era, transparency and public 
openness, a revolution that benefits investors, the public and regulators (E.I.T.I 2019). 
Transparency is a requirement for extractive industries, with the aim to discourage corruption 
and improve reputation (E.I.T.I 2019). Linked to Foucault’s governmentality, transparency 
can be viewed as a technology of government (Miller and Rose 1990) use to have control over 
a programme establishes by the government. In this study, transparency is an important 
attitude that helps to bring about efficiency within the DRC’s extractive sector. However, a 
culture of transparency can only take shape when leaders are transparent and encourage such 
attitude around them. That is to say, transparency starts with people. Transparency can also be 
seen as a two-edged-sword: that presents on the one hand an opportunity for government to 
take control over the programme they establish and on the other hand gives the citizens the 
ability to hold the government’ authorities in check. In fact, Stiglitz argues about transparency 
as an essential right of the citizens to know and to be educated about what government is 
doing and why it is doing it (Stiglitz1999 see Bellver & Kaufman (2005). This reasoning 
certainly underpins government action (political rationality) and influences government 
decision-making. 
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Political economy describes transparency as the capability of data expanding effectiveness in 
the distribution of assets and helping to ensure that the benefits of development are 
reallocated effectively among all stakeholders (Bellver & Kaufman 2005). Foucault 
governmentality discusses the programme of government and technology of government 
shaping people life. Technical rationality here can be the instrumental reasoning around how 
much information the government is willing to disclose to allow citizens to debate how the 
revenues generated by extractive sectors is being allocated. When the same information does 
not reach all concerned stakeholders, we experience information asymmetry. that creates a 
lack of trust. Nobel Prize in 2001 George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz 
analyzed the asymmetry of information causing economic imbalances that result in adverse 
selection (one party have more information than other) and moral hazards (one party entering 
to agreement provides misleading information).  
If we believe Byung & Shul Han (2015), transparency should create trust. When the 
information is easy to collect, the social systems change from trust to control. What the 
authors mean is that where transparency take place, there is no room for trust, instead control 
prevails (Han 2015). As a result, a transparent society becomes a society of control (Han 
2015;p vii) and in control. A society of control and surveillance reflects the panopticon. used 
by Michel Foucault as a metaphor for the modern disciplinary society (Foucault, 1977). He 
argued that the techniques used to discipline society in the 18
th
 has developed. Nowadays, 
society uses different techniques and mechanism to ensure discipline (Foucault 1977) 
Transparency as a technology of government has been used as a requirement to discipline 
extractives sectors in country rich in natural resources. The lack of transparency in the 
management of natural resources can have a devastating effect such loss of investment. 
Within the dynamic of transparency, holding information can be related to control, operating 
within the panopticon of sorts. Transparency is not a bad thing for the society or the 
institutions. It is a powerful instrument of social control in term of accounting and audit 
linked to governmentality and accountability. 
3.3 Accountability 
Accountability is about checking and oversight crucial for discovering realities and producing 
proof (Schedler, Diamond & Plattner 1999). However, it is also related to the power 
mandated by laws and needed to engage actors in public debates (ibid.). According to 
Diamond and Plattner (1999), accountability has two dimensions: the answerability and the 
enforcement (requirement). The answerability dimension is "the capacity to guarantee that 
28 
 
authorities in government are liable for their activities" (Schedler, Diamond & Plattner 1999 
p.14). It suggests that the government has the commitment to answer to any inquiries 
regarding the management of their activities. Answerability is about actors explaining the 
reasons to their choices. To be effective, answerability should be followed by enforcement 
measures. Enforcement measurements are about asking what has been done or will be done, 
and giving the reasons that framed decision-making., there. It contains components of 
implementation such as rewarding good behaviours and punishing bad conducts (Schedler, 
Diamond & Plattner 1999); it is about concerned actors having to answer for their actions and 
to endure the consequences of their bad behaviours (ibid.). The lack of enforcement makes 
accountability appear to be weak (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner (1999). The sanction 
mechanism has been used to monitor and prevent accountability failure in management, has 
“to get the incentives right” (Schedler, Diamond & Plattner 1999 p 16) and to prevent the 
impunity to keep on prospering. Accountability can be dissociated from enforcement 
measurement in some situation. There are situations wherein questions of answerability do 
not matter, such as demanding actors to resign without any explanation to avoid discourses in 
narrations (Schedler, Diamond & Plattner 1999).  
Governmentality views accountability as a rationality that enlightens practices in relationship 
with institutions and actors (Katomero 2017). It shows how institutions should be governed in 
a well-established plan to regulate and control their behaviour (Katomero 2017). The people 
involved are appointed “officeholders”, persons in a position of power within a government or 
an organization (ibid.). Consequently, formal accountability agreed by law or decree 
established in advance the power relation between two different officeholders such as 
members of parliament and executive officials (Katomero 2017). In the case of this study, 
E.I.T.I as a programme of government reflects a way to regulate and control the governance 
of extractive sector within the DRC. The multi-Stakeholders hold the power assign to them by 
a national decree. Expectations are formulated on the E.I.T.I requirements and actors are 
allocated to execute as mentioned in "Accountability as an element of governmentality” 
Katomero (2017) dissertation. Katomero’s (2017) point of view is that E.I.T.I multi-
stakeholders accountability power is already pre-defined by decree, rationalized by well-
organized actions with the goal of maximum efficiency (Scott, 2003 in Katomero 2017). 
Governance practices are also formalized to the extent that actors are aware of their 
responsibilities and can act independently (Scott 2003 see Katomero 2017), which lead to a 
normalisation of behaviours.  
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Governmentality views accountability in term of mentalities wealth that comprehends the 
regime of practices expressing certain forms of knowledge and beliefs (Katomero, 2017). It is 
about cultural and unwritten knowledges which actors are enclosed by, like the concept of 
transparency. Consequently, mentality involves common thinking, belief and opinion in 
which actors are within to (Dean 2010:27). Mentality according to Katomero (2017) is 
collective and often is not questioned by individuals who dwell it. Thus, it can be referred to 
“Habitus
12
” of Bourdieu (1984). 
Governmentality also views accountability as a technology of government. The focus here is 
how the government organizes and design particular systems for accountability relationships 
(Katomero 2017). The E.I.T.I technical office in the DRC constitutes the organizational sense 
of design for accountability. It has the task to inform extractive sector accountability 
improvements. Furthermore, to evaluate the E.I.T.I implementation, requirements are to be 
followed (E.I.T.I 2020) such as reporting. The study will focus on reporting accountability 
and the following section we developed the third practice of governmentality: governance. 
3.4 Governance 
Müller (2016) defined governance in the realm of projects as the value system, structures 
processes and policies that allow projects to achieve organizational objective. Governance 
requires the use of control and trust as mechanisms to reduce risk of hazard (Williamsons, 
1991). In a booklet published by the World Bank in 1992, entitled "Governance and 
Development", governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources for development”. According to the 
UNDP, good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparency and 
accountability. It must be effective and equitable by promoting the rule of law. Additionally, 
good governance must ensure that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad 
consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in 
decision-making over the allocation of development resources. Governance link to the 
concept of governmentality is “the mentality, rationality and way of interaction, chosen by the 
governance roles to implement, maintain and change the governance structure” (Müller, 
2016, p20). Governance addresses the use of control and trust as operating mechanisms (Dean 
2010). Here, the global standard E.I.T.I is implemented in the DRC as a governance tool 
using transparency and accountability as mechanisms to perform efficiently. According to 
                                                 
12 “Habitus” a system of practice-generating schemes which expresses systematically the necessity and freedom inherent in the collective 
conditions of life of a certain group of people” (Inglis 2019. P. 200). 
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Foucault (2002) transparency and accountability are tactics developed by institutions to 
discipline stakeholders and to take control over actors’ minds and attitudes in the management 
of natural resource. He expressed it as a modality of power called panopticon
13
 (Foucault 
1975). Thus, the implementation of the global standard reflects a mechanism to make power 
operate more efficiently in the management of the extractive sector within the DRC. By 
implementing transparency and accountability, the government watches or controls 
stakeholders and hope to reach a self-regulation of actors to act in the ways demanded of them 
by the global standard. 
In summary, Transparency, accountability and governance are organized practices for 
governing connected to governmentality framework. They are created by institutions to have 
power over managerial of natural resources. Here, they are used to analyse the governance of 
the extractive sector in the DRC. 
4 Methodology 
This study used a mixed (qualitative and quantitative) exploratory sequential design (Creswell 
& Creswell 2018) to explore the implementation of a phenomenon within a setting. It is 
appropriate here because the researcher bases the inquiry on the assumption that collecting 
diverse types of data best provides a more complete understanding of a research problem than 
either quantitative or qualitative data alone. It starts with the qualitative research phase 
(methods rely on text and image data) and explores the views of participants (Creswell & 
Creswell 2018, p15). Moreover, the data are analysed, and the information used to build into a 
second, quantitative phase (ibid.). The qualitative phase was important for the establishment 
of questionnaire. The use of qualitative phase helps to select various actors implicated to this 
research. 
 
Table 1: Data sources for the study 
 Primary source  Secondary source  
Qualitative Interviews, participant 
observations, informal 
conversation 
Government documents, 
NGO reports, WB, IMF, 
E.I.T.I, NRGI, PWYP 
reports, published and 
unpublished articles, 
websites, blogs, social media,  
Mixed  Complemented with semi-
structured interviews  
Government documents, 
NGO reports, published and 
                                                 
13 The Panopticon(all-seeing eye in Greek) was a ring –shaped building with at the center a tower (Inglis 2019,p170). A prison system, 
invented by Jeremy Bentham as a symbol for modern authority and discipline in the western world. 
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unpublished articles, WB 
reports, IMF reports, E.I.T.I 
reports  
 
The mixed research design of this study used qualitative and quantitative methods of 
collecting data. Qualitative research reviews the prerequisites of potential setting for the 
proposal or study (Creswell & Creswell 2018) 
This study is a fieldwork performed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1 
February to 18 March 2020. It tailed all necessary research formalities, including clearance 
from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU). This study took a limited 
selection of actors from a larger one with a view to reaching an in-depth understanding of the 
studied phenomenon (Sörqvist, 2000). However, in combination with the limited actors, the 
result cannot be generalized (Holme & Solvang 1997). 
The E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat in Kinshasa and in the Upper Katanga in Lubumbashi 
(mining province in the DRC) served as my anchorage during the fieldwork and the team that 
assisted me during the all period. The E.I.T.I/DRC also assisted me with sharing information 
and services such as contact with mining companies and access to technical data. For the 
period of five weeks in Lubumbashi I visited and interviewed four extractive companies, four 
communities, two national NGOs and two international NGOS, and three public institutions.  
The Lubumbashi province was selected because it is one of the biggest mining provinces in 
the DRC and the E.I.T.I/DRC has an antenna there. Lubumbashi is strategically situated and 
there are several mining companies in the region. Income generated from the mines and 
ancillary activities contribute largely to the country. The study also relied on independent 
informants associated with the implementation of E.I.T.I/DRC such as the former prime 
minister and select senior advisers to the initiative. Some limits in the path of data collection 
occurred and led to cancelation of interview appointments because of the Covid-19 pandemic.  
To get a deeper understanding of how stakeholders were organized and the impact of 
implementing E.I.T.I in relation to their activities, the study was made of two methods: 
interviews with different stakeholders and document reviews  
4.1 Interviews with stakeholders 
I conducted the one-on-one interview with political and administrative officials at the national 
and local government levels. I had a semi-structured interview
14
 guide organized around the 
                                                 
14
 A semi-structured interview is a meeting in which the interviewer does not strictly follow a formalized list of questions. Instead, they will 
ask more open-ended questions, allowing for a discussion with the interviewee rather than a straightforward question and answer format 
(Creswell & Creswell 2018) 
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themes of Transparency and trust; Governance and institution; Politic and policy to motivate 
actors in the interviews. (See annexe 3, 4, 5). It provides reliable and comparable qualitative 
data.  
I had a discussion sessions with community groups using a semi-structured interview as well 
in order to have the emic picture of how there have understood and been experiencing the 
implementation of the E.I.T.I global standard. 
A total of 18 meetings were held during the visit in the DRC including different organizations 
from government, civil societies, private sector and communities. All these actors are dealing 
at different level with the implementation of the E.I.T.I standard.  
There are up to five ministries that are directly involved with the E.I.T.I implementation in the 
DRC; planning, finances, mines, Hydrocarbon and environment. There are provincial 
ministries and national ministries. Out of these five ministries, three was available for 
interviews (mines, finances, and planning). An email with questions was sent ahead to prepare 
the interview (see annexe 2) on the day of their convenience. Regarding extractives 
companies, with the help of the E.I.T.I/DRC, we send eight emails with our intention for the 
interviews attached with a questionnaire (see annexe 3). Four of them were available for 
interviews and of course on the day of their convenience. Concerning civil societies, we 
choose those dealing with mining and all issues around it. 
Community group 
Three international NGOs located in the DRC were contacted via e-mail and questions were 
sent to them as an attached document (see annexe 4). All three were available and accepted to 
be interviewed. Four national NGOs were contacted via telephone and interviewed based on 
an open-ended questionnaire were conducted. The leader ASEMIR, a Lubumbashi based 
national NGO organised meetings with different communities. After 15 years on the filed 
ASEMIR has had time to build good relationship with local communities. This helped with 
scheduling the discussion sessions. Before starting the interviews, ASEMIR leader and I 
organised a planning meeting. We targeted the communities that live around mines, with a 
goal was to have a focus group of 10 people comprised of neighbourhood leaders, 
tribal/ethnic group chief, church leader, schools’ employees, women and children. The 
community group had to be homogeneous, meaning constituted of people sharing the same 
experience. A heterogeneous group would have been less efficient, because the study was 
about governance issue and not all local people are informed about how resources are 
managed within the country. Gathering literate and illiterate in the same group would have 
created frustration and resulted in less openness.  
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Figure 5: Kipushi Community workshop. A group composed of neighbourhood leaders, 
customary/tribal chief, church leader, and people working in schools, women and children. 
Mainly, interviews were semi-structured and explorative and focused on the following matters  
- general knowledge of the initiative 
- the impact of the initiative in their activities 
- sustainability of the initiative 
- the constraints they encounter in implementing the initiative 
4.2 Document reviews 
The documentary review furnishes one with a prospect to engage with the literature that has 
already been completed for other purposes. The document review process described here take 
account of the review of studies that had been previously collected by various organizations 
and individuals. They include both published and unpublished materials by researchers, 
government agencies and NGOs. The process of reviewing them was done systematically by 
identifying, analysing and developing useful information from them 
The literature relied on a broad search of peer-reviewed journal articles from databases and 
information portals such as Springer, research gate, Academia, science direct, Jstor, web of 
science, Scopus, Google Scholars, Sage Research Methods and PubMed Common key words 
used to search these sources included transparency, governance, natural resources, 
accountability, transparency initiative, resource curse, corruption. The reference part for 
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each article found was examined in order to find additional relevant articles .Third, key 
scholastic and technology journals from around the world were searched independently and 
included the following publications; the journal of development studies, Science Direct, U4, 
E.I.T.I, World Bank, IMF, OECD. The search process uncovered 53 peer-reviewed articles 
published from 2007-2020. 
4.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis is a process of segmenting, taking apart the data and modelling data to discover 
useful information (Creswell & Creswell 2018). Schatzman and Strauss in Creswell & 
Creswell (2018:208) also discussed data analysis as a step to frame information collect on the 
field by using index and code. Creswell & Creswell (2018:194) discussed steps to consider 
during a qualitative analysis to make sense out of interviews, documents, images, records, 
images collected on the field. This study did not use code or index. However, we categorized 
interviews questionnaire into themes (see annex 3, 4, 5). Following are the steps considered in 
this study:  
 Step 1: the organization of data into source categories. i.e. by stakeholders: 
government, extractive companies, Civil society (national and international NGOs and 
national communities.  
 Step 2: capturing the general ideas of the participants’ discourse. Creswell & Creswell 
(2018) argued the use of ‘Winnow’ as a process of focusing on important data and 
ignoring less relevant ones. Interviewing political representatives and civil society 
actors was a challenge because of the large amount of information received during the 
interviews, as result winnow was an efficient method to deal with the collected data.  
 Step 3: we focus on combining all data and decide for the use of a framework to 
evaluate transparency level in the DRC. Used themes are governance and institution, 
transparency and trust, politic and strategy, and the E.I.T.I requirements were used as 
a framework to guide and to evaluate existing transparency within the national 
extractive industries.  
 Step 4: focused on transcribing collected information from French to English and it 
has been time and energy consumption. However, this step involves connecting 
information to empirical theories. The administrative concepts that guide our analysis 
are transparency, accountability and governance. It is important to mention that these 
concepts are present with the actors without a clear and defined theme. Actors 
understood them according to the context (emic terms) and under data analysis I 
reflect on them using my scholarly interpretation (etic terms). For instance, when we 
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point out solid mineral management among actors, key word such as corruption, 
governance, power, and politic was mentioned by them to express how badly manage 
the resources were. This is to say that key words repetition under discussion 
strengthened the concepts of choice linked to the study.  
 Step 5: was the framework table establishment with attributes to help analysing and 
discussing transparency in the discussion section.  
 Step 6: will be categorizing coded themes to make sure to have diverse perspectives of 
the findings. 
 Step 7: was to find the theory to guide all study in relation to concepts use during the 
field work 
 Step 8: focused on ranging the concepts information to have a big picture of the 
finding.  
 Step 9: focused on writing a description for each concept. A summary of interview 
was made to perceive harmonies and discrepancies between stakeholders’ point of 
views (see table 4, 5, 6). 
E.I.T.I Attributes Explanations  
Oversight by the 
multi‑stakeholder group. 
Government commitment; company engagement; civil society 
engagement, multi-stakeholder group; work plan 
Legal, institutional framework & 
allocation of contracts and 
licenses. 
Legitimate structure and financial system; agreement and 
permit distributions; Register of licenses; contracts; Beneficial 
Ownership, state support 
Exploration and production. Exploration, production, exports  
Revenue collection. 
 
Far reaching exposure of charges and incomes , offer of the a 
lot of creation or different incomes gathered in kind; 
framework arrangements and trade courses of action, 
transportation incomes, exchanges identified with state – 
possessed ventures (SOEs), subnational instalments , level of 
disaggregation, information practicality, information quality 
and confirmation 
Revenue allocations. 
 
Dispersion of extractive industry incomes, subnational moves, 
income administrations and uses 
Social and economic spending. 
 
Social and ecological uses by extractive organizations; semi 
monetary consumptions, the commitment of the extractive 
part to the economy; natural effect of extractive exercises 
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Outcomes and impact. Open discussion, information availability and open 
information, proposals from E.I.T.I usage, survey the results 
and effect of the E.I.T.I execution 
 
Table 2: Guiding framework and attributes to analyse the state of implementing E.I.T.I 
standard in the DRC 
4.5 Framework explanation 
The Legal, institutional framework and allocation of contracts and licenses 
The E.I.T.I requires the disclosure of information related to management of the extractive 
industries to allow interested party to comprehend the laws and procedures for granting 
production and exploration constitutional rights; the legal, regulatory and contractual 
framework which applies to the extractive sector and the institutional responsibilities of the 
State in the managing of alleged sector (E.I.T.I, 2019).This requires a transparent legal 
framework for the granting of mining rights and includes: 
- The legal framework & tax regime 
- The granting of licenses 
- The license registers 
- The contracts 
- Beneficial ownership 
- State participation in the extractive sector 
The Exploration and production 
The E.I.T.I (2019) requires the publication of exploration and production information that 
allow shareholders to comprehend the fullest potential of the extractive sector. This 
requirement is linked to a transparency in exploration and production deeds and consists of 
information on prospecting activities, production data and export data.  
Revenue collection 
Understanding how corporate payments and state revenues are received and allocated can 
improve public debate and can become a way for everyone to participate in the management 
of the extractive industries. The E.I.T.I (2019) requires a complete balancing of corporate 
payments and government revenues from the extractive industries as follows in order to 
further develop the industry:  
- Full disclosure of taxes and revenues 
- Full disclosure of the trade of state production, shares or other income received in kind 
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- Groundwork supplies and barter agreements 
- Income from transport 
- Operations related to state enterprises 
- Sub-national payments 
- The level of disaggregation 
- The accuracy and quality of the data  
Revenue allocations 
Revenue allocations require the disclosure of information related to distributed income. This 
allows stakeholders to understand how income is distributed in national, local government 
budgets as well as community spending by companies (E.I.T.I, 2019). The E.I.T.I 
Requirements relating to the allocation of income include: 
- Income distribution, 
- Subnational transfers and 
- Income and expense management  
Collective and economic spending 
This requires disclosure of information related to social spending and the impact of the 
extractive sector on the economy, thereby helping stakeholders to assess the extent to which 
the extractive sector is achieving the desired social and economic outcomes. E.I.T.I 
Requirements related to social and economic spending include: 
- Community spending by company 
- Additional taxes expenditures of state-owned enterprises 
- Synopsis of the contribution of the extractive sector to the economy (E.I.T.I, 2019). 
Results and impact 
Companies and state governments are encouraged to regularly disclose data linked to 
management and governance in the extractive industries. These data are only useful in 
practice if the general public is aware of the significance of the figures published and 
disclosed in a public debate on the efficient use of resource revenues (E.I.T.I, 2019).  
The E.I.T.I’s Results and Impact Requirements seek to ensure stakeholder engagement in a 
discussion on the governance of natural resource revenues. The E.I.T.I reports give rise to 
agreement with E.I.T.I principles and bring a wider public debate (ibid.).This requirement 
highlights the implementation of lessons learned and that the gaps identified in E.I.T.I reports 
are illuminated and if possible corrected for sustainability of the E.I.T.I’s process on a 
constant and sustainable basis (ibid.). 
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4.6 Positionality statement 
My work experience has influenced my views on polities and politics. At the beginning of 
June 2014 until January 2017, I worked as a research analyst at the Prime minister office in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. As a fellow of the Prime minister cabinet I was 
implicated to different kinds of high-level administrative deeds. I was part of decisions 
making particularly for huge projects planned to improve citizen’s livelihood. I operated 
closely with different local ministries, foreign organizations as well with the President board 
of trustees. I believe my background gave me advantages and have easy my work on the field 
for this study. However, I did not escape challenges. The world I faced is a world dominated 
by men. Latest in the DRC do not have much consideration for women. Educated or not 
educated, they always feel superior. I had with me an understanding of how high ranked 
public officials patronize educated women and the awareness kept me from being offended.  
However, my objectivity side takes over the subjective side in order to avoid mixing my 
personal experience during the data interpretations. 
As mentioned above, I must deal with high ranked public officials and my expectations to 
collect important information to the study was not high because of power relations. Power did 
manifest itself in different form such once I have to wait five hours in the office before being 
received. With this in mind inquirers explicitly identify reflexively their biases, values, and 
personal backgrounds such as gender, history, culture, and socioeconomic status that shape 
their interpretations formed during the study. I have studied the governance of natural 
resources, and conflict around natural resources which means that I had some pre-
understanding of what transparency might mean for the actors I have to meet. However, I 
must admit that I became emotional when I had to meet local communities and witness 
extreme poverty in one side and countless extractive industries around them and I questioned 
the impact of the initiative. 
5 Findings 
5.1 Empirical finding 
The section presents E.I.T.I’s implementation progress in the DRC. Based on the data 
collected using the framework and attributes presented in the method section, and data 
generated from individual interviews and focus groups. The questionnaires used to interview 
stakeholders are shown in annexes, 3, 4, 5. The answers received from stakeholders are 
summarized and shown in tables 4, 5, 6. It is important to point out transparency, 
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accountability and governance main concepts to the study were not always easy to explain to 
actors. Concepts such as trust were used to gather proper information about accountability and 
institution, politics and policies connected to governance. 
Table 3: Summary of key elements of E.I.T.I requirement reflecting the DRC progress in 
implementing the E.I.T.I standard  
Attributes Progress in the DRC  
 
 
 
 
Oversight by the 
multi-stakeholder 
group 
March 2005, The DRC organised an international forum in Kinshasa with 
the support of the World Bank and the DFID to discuss how to implement 
the E.I.T.I in the DRC. The participants were industry representatives, the 
government, national and internationals NGOs 
On November 18, 2005, the President of the Republic published decree 
No.05/160 establishing and structuring the National Committee for the 
Initiative on Transparency in the Management of Revenue from Extractive 
Industries in the Democratic Republic of Congo (E.I.T.I /DRC 2018) 
On May 3, 2006, the speech of adhesion was ratified by the decree n ° 001 / 
CAB.MIN / PL / 2006 of the Minister of the Plan, President of the Steering 
Committee of the E.I.T.I-DRC which designated the structures of the 
stakeholders the members of the E.I.T.I-DRC Technical Committee. 
 
On September 19, 2006, the diagnostic studies of the mining sector based 
on the first group of products that were the subjects of the publication of 
the report (copper and related metals, cobalt and diamond) was decided in 
order to allow the Technical Committee to identify the priority E.I.T.I 
application points and the multi-stakeholders was legally formed  
July 16
th
 2009, E.I.T.I-DRC legally exists according to decree n ° 09/27 of 
July 16, 2009 establishing, organizing and operating the National 
Committee of the Initiative for Transparency in the management of 
extractive industries in the Democratic Republic of Congo, CN-E.I.T.I / 
Ground floor in acronym. 
 
 
 
 
The DRC mining sector, which is supposed to bring substantial revenues to 
the state for its economic and social development, has failed to meet these 
expectations, leading to a review of the Mining Code and its application. 
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Legal, institutional 
framework, and 
allocation of contracts 
and licenses. 
March 09, 2018 - Law n ° 18/001 amending and supplementing Law n ° 
007/2002 of July 11, 2002 bearing on the Mining Code was published. 
The DRC through its mining code provides information connected to the 
legal framework and the granting of constitutional rights in the extractive 
sector. The articles 32-49 of the DRC mining code allow interested party to 
comprehend the laws and measures relating to the granting of exploitation 
and production rights, the monitoring and contractual legal framework 
applying to the extractive sector and the State’s institutional responsibilities 
in the executive of the sector. 
The mining code is public and can be found at the E.I.T.I/DRC and 
government websites. 
The DRC have a declarative regime (This regime means that it is up to 
taxpayers to file their tax returns on specific deadlines). (Can they choose 
not to do it?) 
 
 
 
 
Exploration and 
production.  
The E.I.T.I/DRC publishes the contextual report and the conciliation report. 
As required by the E.I.T.I, extractive companies publish information on 
their production, sales and what they pay to the state in a timely manner.  
The DRC stakeholders use online software (transparencies/SL) to automate 
reporting by companies and government representations. They publish 
information related to exploration and production. Extractive companies 
enforce E.I.T.I measures also follow the DRC’s the mining. 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue collection 
There has been significant progress to advocate transparency of extractive 
sector revenue collection in the DRC. However there have been successes 
and failures. The financial information related to the extractive sector has 
been published in the E.I.T.I/DRC’s website and on the government’s 
websites, as well as the results of audits and other valuations that focus on 
the financial information. E.I.T.I/DRC highlight weaknesses and other 
issues linked to the data collection. Need of capacity building to understand 
this requirement among stakeholders. 
 
 
 
The new mining code provides for a new distribution of the mining royalty. 
It is indeed planned that 50% of the royalty go to the national province, 
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Revenue allocations. 
25% to the administration of the province, 15% to the decentralized 
territorial entity (ETD) where the exploitation takes place and 10% to a 
mining fund for future generations (Agathe smyth 2019) 
 
 
 
 
Community and 
economic spending. 
The E.I.T.I/DRC publishes data linked to the extractive industries revenue 
management and economic spending in order to help stakeholders to 
evaluate their impact with regards to social, economic and environment 
responsibilities. Meanwhile, companies do publish their CSR, and on the 
other hand Government have to work harder to do the same. The impact of 
activities on the environment is present and local communities complain 
about the authorities. The mining code mentions questions related to the 
environment and how to deal with them. 
 
 
 
 
Results and impact 
Since joining the E.I.T.I, the DRC has published 11 reports. These reports 
are voluminous, and the technical secretariat publishes summary reports 
taking up a concise and well-adjusted analysis of the data presented in the 
E.I.T.I report. In addition, there is a version adaptable to communities. Two 
third of the communities approached during this study had never heard of 
the initiative and were not aware of the income allocations generated by the 
extractive industries or the revenues allocated to the communities. 
 
 
In summary, all aspects of E.I.T.I requirements have been executed by stakeholders according 
to the framework and, the DRC has made meaningful progress. In fact, in 2019 the DRC was 
validated as a country making satisfactory progress in implementing E.I.T.I (E.I.T.I 2020). 
Moreover, some aspects of requirements has been implemented beyond the requirements; 
legal framework, policy on contract disclosure and public debate (E.I.T.I 2020). However, the 
success of the initiative must be reflecting on stakeholders. The following chapter, leads us to 
the findings on transparency, accountability and governance emic understanding from actors 
to analyse the success of the E.I.T.I 
5.2 Transparency 
Summary of answer base on transparency concept see table 5 
Government actors’ emic understanding on transparency 
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Transparency is associated to the traceability of revenues and transparency implemented 
through the E.I.T.I initiative makes it possible to reconcile the production of companies in the 
extractive sector with the incomes collected by the Government (National Finance ministry 
DRC 2020) The Extractive industry is the main contributor to the country's GDP. By bringing 
these elements together, the E.I.T.I plays an important role in improving transparency, 
governance of the extractive industries and the public finances of the DRC (Former Prime 
Minister DRC 2020). These elements put together make it possible to consolidate the 
country's position in the rating of organizations and agencies (Former Prime Minister DRC 
2020). The publication of the E.I.T.I/DRC reports should be systematic in order to allow the 
country to better assess the progress made in the transparency and the governance of 
extractive sector, and to take appropriate action for improvement in these areas. The multi-
stakeholder group is tasked to diligently publish an annual progress report about the extractive 
sector (see requirement 7.4) (E.I.T.I 2020). During the course of our interview we learned that 
the publication of reports is no longer systematic. The last report was published in 2017. The 
delayed in report publication is a signal the institutions are weak in their follow up (Former 
Prime Minister DRC 2020). 
The transparency and traceability of resources linked to finance are very important for the 
extractive sector because the finance ministry needs reliability in the channels in order to fight 
the corruption that erodes public services. Such is the told of systematically publishing 
information (National Finance Minister DRC 2020). The market assesses a high index of 
corruption to the DRC. Transparency within the extractive sector at national and international 
levels will improve the country’s reputation, just as the lack of information contributes to an 
uncertain and questionable marketplace (Province Finance Minister DRC 2020). Nowadays, 
the world is standardized, and it is important to take into account the change in the market 
(former Prime minister senior adviser DRC 2020). The E.I.T.I-reporting has led to 
implementing laws that prevent the loss of revenues (Former province Finance Minister DRC 
2020). Furthermore, transparency has served as an indicator for Doing Business, for Human 
development Index (HDI), for corruption and for sovereign rating.  
Extractive industries emic understanding on transparency 
Informants from the local extractive industry, Ruashi Mining, Mutanda Mining, Mineral 
Metal Group and Ivanhoe mining, stated that transparency is more related to corporate social 
responsibilities (CSR), meaning contributions to the local communities such as building 
schools, hospitals, etc. However, they all questioned the transparency of revenues state 
officials transfer to the public treasury. According to them the State does not initiate projects 
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and is not knowledgeable about how the industry operates, therefore, it should not have 
control over the proceeds from the industry’s activities. Transparency to be successful, 
however, should be based on political will. Industry informants noticed the failure to pass 
legislation, enforce sanctions, etc. Authorities are too involved in the extractive value chain 
with an abundance of red tapes across various jurisdictions and corruption involving major 
companies and corporate vehicles used to cover up payments that compromise the efficiency 
of the E.I.T.I/DRC technical office’s data collection (Anonymous source DRC 2020). It is an 
E.I.T.I requirement for the industries to declare publicly the taxes they pay to the state. It is 
also a requirement for the state to disclose publicly what it perceives from the industries. 
However, what is declared by industries is not what it is supposed to be declared because the 
mineral deposit’s value is underestimated due to the lack of technology and an inadequate 
control system put in place by the government.  
Civil society’s emic understanding on transparency (Civil societies dealing only with 
extractive sector in the DRC) 
Interacting with the civil society revealed that transparency is related to the publication of 
information regarding revenue generated by the extractive industries. The civil societies that 
informed us, NRGI, PWYP, Licoco, the Carter center, Pom DRC, are more concerned about 
truth and governance in the interest of the people they assist. According to these 
organizations, the E.I.T.I initiative has had a positive impact on the DRC in that it provides 
the populations with information relating to extractive income and enables them to debate 
about it and hold leaders accountable. However, they question the information they receive 
from the E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat when they find incoherence in the reported. 
Crosschecking the information plays an important role in strengthening transparency, they 
point out. The civil society’s performance in the DRC has led to their form of mining code in 
2018. In fact, in 2019, the E.I.T.I board reported the amazing advancement made by civil 
societies in organizing public debate. 
Our informants also mentioned that as civil societies in the DRC they face additional 
challenges as part of the multi-stakeholders group. They depend on aids from developed 
countries. The delay of aid endangers their performances in the field, and they are often not 
able to attend multi-stakeholders’ meetings because of missing or delayed transport 
allowances. If they cannot perform as members of multi-stakeholders group, the country will 
not see the positive impact of the global standard through the multi-stakeholders group. 
Therefore they, as representative of the most vulnerable members of society, will not fulfil 
their role in in advocating transparency with companies and government. t.  
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For example, they estimate that the process in granting exploitation contract does not take 
place in a transparent manner; yet transparency in the granting contract is more important than 
the publication of contract which is not transparency in itself. Finally, the informants were 
unanimous of the fact that E.I.T.I is caught in a political system that holds back the institution 
from accomplishing its intended mission. Where there is no freedom of expression, the 
availability of information does not truly exist to benefit the citizens and transparency does 
not really takes roots.  
Communities’ emic understanding on transparency 
Communities of Ruashi, Kipushi, Tenke Fungurume, Kolwezi communities look at 
transparency in terms of the benefits the rip from the revenues generated from the extractive 
sector. They expressed the belief that the government is deceptive and does not inspire 
confidence. In their view accountability is needed before transparency. The revenues from 
extractive industries are supposed to have an impact on reducing poverty and mining 
companies voluntary contribute to the local communities’ welfare by building schools, 
hospitals, roads etc. These projects are however decided without implicating them in the 
decision-making process. The DRC has laws regarding voluntary and compulsory social 
spending. However, the communities revealed that they unable to monitor the application of 
that law with regards to the extractive sector hence the lack of transparency. There exist two 
forms of spending: compulsory spending and voluntary spending. Extractives industries are 
mandated to report the compulsory spending’s to communities but they often misrepresent the 
facts by reporting voluntary social spending’s as compulsory spending and gate away by 
bending the laws. Extractive sector policies in the DRC focus on creating jobs and develop 
capacity in the population. However, according to the local communities, the industry does 
not live up to its mission and many youth people find themselves involved in illegal mining 
and exporting activities. 
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E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat emic understanding on transparency 
Stakeholders should view the E.I.T.I as a standard that is set up for promoting transparency, 
accountability in the extractive sector. A culture of transparency and democratic debate is 
gradually gaining ground even if there is still too much resistance that prevents the 
E.I.T.I/DRC from leading far-reaching policy changes in the extractive sector. Disclosing 
information is supposed to be voluntary according to the E.I.T.I/DRC but it hasn’t been easy 
for the stakeholders to publish information on time; sometimes the information published was 
incomplete and required additional work of the technical secretariat especially when dealing 
with Public. Sometimes the technical secretariat can collect contradictory information 
between public institutions. For example, The Central Bank of the DRC would provide 
statistical data on production and exportation that would not always match with the data from 
the National Institute for Statistics (INS). Informants at the E.I.T.I opine that the institution 
more than often need to work extra hard in order to deliver on the promise of a transparent 
extractive sector by taking the fight to the country’s institutions. 
5.3 Accountability 
Summary of Answer base on the interviews connected to the trust concept to refer to 
accountability (see table 4& 5) 
Government emic understanding on accountability 
Accountability is related to behaviour. According to the former prime Minster of the DRC, 
National or local officials expected to abide by the letter of the laws that govern the extractive 
sector and to provide efficient qualitative and quantitative services to. The E.I.T.I as goals that 
cover the entire value chain of the industry, from the decision to extract to the collection and 
management of revenues, as stated by the National Finance minister of the DRC. It could be 
said the government and institutions are guided by rules to avoid poor outcomes, therefore the 
requirement to disclose all relevant information to E.I.T.I/DRC on a timely basis. Citizens 
have the right to hold the government and the industry accountable for the mismanagement of 
natural resources and any negative. 
Extractive industries emic understanding in accountability 
The extractive industries relate accountability to political economy. The extractive sector is an 
important sector to the DRC. It generates revenues that contribute up to 18% of the country 
GDP (World Bank 2019) and is viewed as a strategic sector for the country’s economy. 
There, accountability is seen as very important to the contribution of the welfare of the 
citizens according to Ruashi mining, Mumi, MMG, and Ivanhoe mining. The extractive 
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sector’s management in the DRC is not systematic. The country went through several conflict 
periods that impacted the economy. Before the armed conflicts, the mining sector was solely 
managed by the state. Aspects such as transportation, communication, import, export, health, 
were under the state’s purview. After the 1990s armed conflict, the country’s economy was 
down and there was a need to boost it. The 2002 mining code was published in favour of 
investors. The country stopped being the industry’s sole manager and a joint venture system 
took place. Public institutions were impacted by legislative changes as mentioned in preview 
paragraphs; changes that for a while unsettled the institutions. Corruption, already present, 
increased due to the fact that many contracts were signed privately, and nobody knew who 
were behind the licences. Opacity in natural resources’ deposits also impacted the revenues 
collected and production data. So, E.I.T.I/DRC came to be viewed as an auditor in the mind 
of the industry. 
Civil Society emic understanding on accountability 
For the civil societies such as PWYP, NRGI, POM, the Carter Center DRC, accountability is 
related to review government pledges and compare that with the reality encountered by 
citizens. the E.I.T.I/DRC’s technical secretariat has published yearly the progress report ever 
since the DRC have joined the E.I.T.I. It has been is a significant mean of communication 
between stakeholders. It offers an opportunity to exhibit what the E.I.T.I implementation did 
accomplish in order to improve transparency and reinforce natural resource management in 
compliance with E.I.T.I’s standards. According to PWYP, NRGI, POM, the Carter Center 
DRC, Civil societies have contributed to the technical secretariat’s reports through while-
blowing, visiting the most vulnerable villages, talking to government officials, extractives 
industries’ representatives and any person who could provide useful information. ; they 
validate their investigations against the information reported by the , the technical secretariat 
reported; they shared their findings with an audience of mostly NGOs so that they can use the 
information to call and hold the government accountable for its actions through international 
accountability mechanisms (i.e. The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM)) or 
government officials in the position of affecting changes. A key setback is that the 
government that the ability to sensor information and often does (the Center Carter DRC 
2020). Accountability for the management of natural resources needs to reach across the 
entire government, not just for institutional dealings with the extractive sector. This is 
something E.I.T.I’s report highlight.  
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Communities emic view on accountability. During the meeting we used the concept trust to 
connect to accountability 
To local communities, accountability is related to the ways in which businesses are embedded 
in their communities (Kipushi, Tenke Fungurume and Kolwezi communities DRC 2020). The 
mining venture is in the corporate of extracting valued natural resources for return.? However, 
poverty, health and education challenges across the upper Katanga (mining province in the 
DRC) are related to the lack of economic growth. Mining have taken place in poor areas 
where social infrastructure social services (health and education) are limited. However, the 
hope that mining companies would step up and be answerable for basic services in lieu of the 
the government is high. Companies should engage in a dialog with the communities in order 
to better contribute to local development (Tenke Fungurume community DRC 2020). Mining 
ventures tend to improve local employment opportunities, but it is not enough (Kipushi 
community DRC 2020). Communities have experienced negative effects such as low income 
and many contracts such as providing for electricity and water that never materialized 
(Kipushi and Ruashi communities DRC 2020). 
E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat emic understanding on accountability 
Accountability is related to the implementation of E.I.T.I as an indicator of performance in 
the management of natural resources. The E.I.T.I/DRC collects information from stakeholders 
and reconciles them. However, the information requires auditing before publishing. Experts in 
audit are mostly implicated to ensure information accountability and reliability. International 
audit agencies collaborate with local audit agencies in order to collect reliable information 
that would be included in the E.I.T.I’s annual report. Sometimes audit agencies have 
challenges due to the fact that some companies and institutions refuse to disclose. 
5.4 Governance 
This section summarizes the answers based on interviews connected to governance as 
political and strategical concepts (see table 6). To communities we use politic and strategy 
concepts to refer to governance. 
Government emic understanding on governance 
The Government related governance to leadership. According to the former prime minister in 
the DRC (2020), good governance (process of decision making) and strong leadership (a 
person influencing and leading others) exercised at the top of the State would make it possible 
to take advantage of the information published by E.I.T.I/DRC in order to make appropriate 
decisions and significantly reducing corruption. The policies developed are supposed to 
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contribute to the wellbeing of the citizens; in this context they deserve to be made aware of 
various policy decisions that have a direct impact on their way of life. Also, the citizens must 
be informed about the results of the policies established and implemented by the government. 
This allows on the one hand to evaluating said policies and on the other hand to continuously 
adjust and improve them if and when necessary. The E.I.T.I is a tool of governance, and 
institutions to abide by requirements of the global standard and to be responsible in order to 
achieve mandated goals (former senior advisor at the prime minister office DRC (2020). 
Extractive Industries understanding of governance 
The Extractive industries related governance to t mining laws and to the mining code (code 
minier), including set of rules, procedures to regulate the identification of potential deposits, 
the exploration and exploitation of gas, oil and solid minerals(Ivanhoe mining DRC 2020). 
the DRC Recently adjusted its mining code (the “2002 Mining Code”) because it was adopted 
to revamp the industrial mining sector after the Congo Wars of 1996 to 2003. But the 
Congolese citizens had hard time to understand what the new code was trying to achieve. Bad 
socio-economic situation did. The new mining code was introduced in March 2008 and 
applied to all holders of mining rights (NRGI DRC 2020). However, it faced strong resistance 
from major mining companies operating in the DRC such as Ivanhoe mines, MMG and 
Ruashi mining. The New Mining Code includes the increase of mining royalties payable by 
the mining companies among other things. (Ruashi mining DRC 2020)  
Civil societies understanding on governance 
The civil society organizations related governance to informing the people and explaining 
them their basics rights and obligations. In truth, governance is more about developing a 
dialog with citizens on matters related to natural resources management and playing a part in 
the democratic process by representing citizens’ interests and helping them improve their 
capacity; as it should be done in collaboration with the government or international NGOs ( 
POM DRC 2020). National civil society organisations such as PWYP, Licoco, and POM, in 
partnership with National and local international NGOs (World Vision, NRGI, Asemir, the 
Carter Center) organize debates to help the public understand how government revenues are 
generated from the extractive sector and spent over time. However, civil society organisations 
can only play this role if they have the freedom to work. Despite the progress made in the area 
of freedom of expression within the DRC, the E.I.T.I implementation has been limited in 
regions that are rich in natural resources due to threats by armed organisations (the Center 
Carter DRC 2020). 
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Communities’ emic understanding on governance. We use politics and policy concept to 
relate to governance 
Kipushi, Ruashi, Tenke Fungurume and Kolwezi communities related governance to royalties 
and environmental waste from extractive activities. The DRC mining code has been revised in 
2018, increasing royalties paid to communities living in mining areas. The holders of mining 
rights have to contribute to development projects for mine activities that affect the 
communities at a tune of at least 0, 3% of their turnover. Yet, the communities are 
complaining that the code has not been implemented accordingly. There is no clarity as to 
which account this 0.3% will be paid to and the populations are worried that the royalties 
might be embezzled. Local Communities are hoping to manage this 0.3% mentioned in the 
mining code.  
The lack in the management of waste from mining industries by companies and government 
worsened local communities’ health and the living environment. The communities are 
complaining about women pregnancies that do not come to term; women giving birth to 
malformed children; residues from industrial smoke, unproductive soils, and poisoned water. 
Furthermore, mining sites are subject to a non-resident workforce. The presence of Chinese in 
mining sites are impacting mining communities as pointed the by majority of communities 
visited. These communities express concern for their children’s safety because of the 
antisocial behaviour from the non-resident workforce. The communities experience critical 
housing shortage as well shortage of critical infrastructure and services, and those with lower 
incomes become homeless (Kipushi, Ruashi, Tenke Fungurume and Kolwezi communities 
DRC 2020) 
E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat understanding on governance 
When discussing governance, the technical secretariat of E.I.T.I/DRC expresses the desire 
that stakeholders would consider the E.I.T.I standards as an index/indicator of performance. 
Corruption as an indicator needs to be improved in the extractive sector and the technical 
secretariat believes that by implementing transparency measures corruption can be 
considerably reduced. When discussing performance, the technical secretariat encounters 
some challenges with companies that refuse to disclose information regarding production, 
taxes payed to the state, and exportation. The lack of information hinders the technical 
secretariat’s effort to publish the reports required by the E.I.T.I international board. The 
delayed in publishing reports send a bad signal to investors or donors about the soundness of 
doing business in the country. Moreover, the technical secretariat depends on the state to be 
proactive, meaning to actively collect data and to implement planned activities. Finally, the 
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delayed in receiving financial data has an impact in the preparation of the yearly report E.I.T.I 
Requirement 7.1 states that the multi-stakeholder group should take into account 
recommendations arising from E.I.T.I Reports. Yet gaps in government systems make it 
difficult for the stakeholders to follow the recommendations made in the E.I.T.I Reports. 
6 Analysis 
The ambition of this study is to find the evidence gap with regards to the mechanisms linking 
E.I.T.I adoption and development outcome to the communities living around the extractive 
industry’s sites. In this section we will analyze results from interviews presented in section 5 
with support from the chosen theoretical concepts in order to provide answers to the initial 
research questions: 
1. Has the E.I.T.I been successful over the years of implementation? 
2. What opportunities and challenges does E.I.T.I face when it comes to improving 
extractive sector management?  
3. How do communities living around extractive industries secure their livelihood and 
how do they experience the impact of E.I.T.I?  
According to governmentality theoretical framework based on Foucault (2003), E.I.T.I as a 
global standard is an organized set of practices policymakers use to manage the extractive 
industries through the implementation of transparency and accountability. Foucault 
governmentality focuses on three organized practices: rationalities, mentalities and 
technologies. These organized practices are used to govern activities and subjects (The 
governed) for the purpose of securing the welfare of the population in the short and long runs 
(Foucault 1991a: 100). 
Foucault guides our understanding of E.I.T.I implementation in the DRC’s, extractive sector. 
his understanding of rationalities, mentalities and technologies is used in combination with 
the E.I.T.I requirements reflecting the country’s progress in implementing the global standard.  
6.1 Has the E.I.T.I been successful over the years of implementation? 
6.1.1 Policy rationality to join the E.I.T.I 
Our study reveals that E.I.T.I implementation in the DRC could be viewed in light of 
Foucault’s organized governmentality practices (Rationality, mentalities and technologies) as 
they shaped the country’s policy choice to join the E.I.T.I. In fact, these practices permeate 
different stages of the process in relation to the extractive sector. Several variables have 
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motivated the country to implement the global standard: Primarily, societal challenges such as 
resource efficiency and raw materials, health, food security, wellbeing, unemployment, 
identify at different levels of society. Secondarily, internal motivation factors such as the 
resource curse, the development level, and corruption. Thirdly, we account for, internal 
aptitude such weak institutions and lastly external pressure such as external debts or 
development assistance (Lujala 2018). 
Choosing The E.I.T.I global standard can be said to primarily derived from the failing 
management of natural resources in the DRC (Lujala 2018) and. the failure of governance in 
the oil, gas and solid minerals(Former DRC prime Minister 2020). Foucault’s view of 
rationality explains this choice. Indeed, he calls for rationality of political choices as a mean 
to solve a problem (Foucault 2003) , in this case reviewing the problems the country faced 
and choosing to join the E.I.T.I as a mean to becoming a business and development friendly 
country(E.I.T.I/DRC 2019); doing so requires to accept the beliefs, that a country’s natural 
deposit belong to its citizens (E.I.T.I 2020). Practical goals as well as thoughtful decisions in 
2005 to help the country to enhance governance of it natural resources after a long period of 
armed conflicts according to the Former Prime minister of the DRC led to the establishment 
of the E.I.T.I to encourage an open and liable management of oil, gas and solid mineral 
resources (E.I.T.I 2020). Thus, we could argue that E.I.T.I global standard, viewed within the 
governmentality paradigm, illustrates a political rationality and the extractives industries and 
agencies conducting business in the DRC are regulated by the implementation of the E.I.T.I. 
6.1.2 Mentalities rationality 
The E.I.T.I adoption has become the common ground for poor countries rich in natural 
resources to promote sound management and public development in the extractive sector 
(Lujala 2018). The relevance of the E.I.T.I has been credited with changing attitudes and 
mentalities in the extractive industries. It is expected that the global standard will provide a 
popular basis for transparency and accountability in the governance and reduce corruption 
(Lujala, Rustad, Le Billon (2017). Foucault (2007) viewed mentality as a way of thinking as 
much as a set of practices, hence the argument that the E.I.T.I is a process of managing 
resources and mentalities (Foucault 2007). Before the implementation of E.I.T.I revenues 
from the extractive industries were known only to the operators (E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). The 
public knew little of what was going on in the industry. Public interest into extractive 
industry’s revenues has grown since the implementation of E.I.T.I. The industry has become 
more alert to its responsibilities on issues of correct disclosures of payments to the 
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government (the Carter Center DRC 2020) related to Foucault governmentality, E.I.T.I 
attempt to shape industries conduct by calculating means ( Foucault 1991).The alert is 
appreciated by government agencies (the Carter Center DRC 2020). Communication activities 
put in place by the national E.I.T.I/DRC committee ensure that mining companies and 
agencies are aware of, understand and are consulted by the E.I.T.I (E.I.T.I 2020).  
6.1.3 Technologies of performance 
To live up to the E.I.T.I’s global standard, the DRC have to rely on indicators / requirements 
established by the E.I.T.I to encourage conforming to best practices. As an economic 
governmental rationality, the DRC have made the extractive sector more productive and more 
effective, for instance transparency and accountability are priority of new public management 
(E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). The attempt to conduct the conducts of other by implementing 
transparency and accountability is a long process because the culture of transparency is new 
within the DRC’s extractive sector. The culture of transparency is new among citizens as 
well, and the hope to improve such mentality is by encouraging public debate, allowing 
citizens to question government political rationality choices. 
In the following paragraphs we will attempt to answer the last two research questions which 
focus on the concepts of transparency, accountability and government within Foucault’s 
governmentality paradigm. These questions as mentioned previously address the opportunities 
and challenges E.I.T.I faces in improving the extractive sector’s management and how  
local communities in affected areas secure their livelihood and experience the impact of 
E.I.T.I. 
6.2 Transparency 
Referring to our section on data collection, we can assert that the DRC has made advancement 
in improving transparency by executing E.I.T.I global standard. The elements of framework 
that refer to transparency can be understood as a technology of government in the spirit of 
Foucault’s conception of governmentality (Foucault, 2007). The transparency element of the 
E.I.T.I framework helps the government evaluate the political rationality choice, meaning the 
E.I.T.I, to solve the problem of governance of natural resources. This sends good signals to 
investors, donors, NGOs that the country is committed to reforming the industry. In 2019, the 
corruption perceptions index shows that the DRC was ranked 168/180 making the DRC one 
of the least reliable countries for doing business (Transparency international 2020). One aim 
of implementing the E.I.T.I transparency framework was to improve the corruption perception 
index for the DRC and contribute to changing practices within the extractive sector in the 
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DRC. That also was shown during interviews with our field study’s informants. Former DRC 
Prime Minister Augustin Matata Mponyo mapon mentioned during his interview that many 
things have changed in terms of stakeholders’ participation. In the same line of thought, the 
Carter Center (international NGO) revealed that E.I.T.I acts as a power-assisted brake. 
Companies that yesterday resisted being transparent think twice now before committing and 
publishing what they owe to the state because of the monitoring and auditing dare improved. 
Transparency as a mental rationality based on Foucault (2007) can be understood as a 
mechanism that shapes the lens of ignorance that manifests itself through limiting access to 
information (Roberts and Armitage 2008). Here, transparency focuses on publishing and 
making information accessible based on the right to know (Bellver & Kaufman 2005). 
Reports need to be effectively communicated to the communities that live close to the mines: 
the communication constitutes as a critical step toward meeting the target 16.10 (see annexe 
2) of the UN SDGS, E.I.T.I/DRC, However, the Carter Center (International NGO) 
mentioned the lack of a culture of reading in the DRC as a problem that limits accessibility to 
the information published by the E.I.T.I/DRC. The information published by E.I.T.I/DRC is 
currently for specific people capable of understanding and grasp information, e.g. students, 
NGOs, etc. The Carter Center also mentioned that these individuals are initiated to access 
information and subsequently transmit it to communities. in reports translated into national 
languages. They facilitate communicating and understanding of the content of the reports, but 
much effort still needs to be done about sharing information regarding revenues from 
extractive sector with communities living around the mines. The civil society plays a huge 
role in this case by enabling an effective debate on the governance of natural resources, 
initiating reforms in order to reinforce transparency by promoting the fight against fraud, 
corruption and misallocation of public revenues.  
However, the efficiency of the dissemination of information is being questioned by 50% of 
communities visited during the field study that claimed that they have never heard of E.I.T.I 
A large amount of data never reaches them and the question remains as to whether the 
information that get to them was sufficient to inform as the information that reached the 
communities has already been filtered. Thus, it can be said that transparency in term of 
sharing information has not been achieved at the micro level since the same information does 
not reached all stakeholders. Stiglitz (1999) argued that it is a given right of the citizens to 
know and to be educated about what government is doing but, it seems that interviewed 
communities are far from being educated accordingly. 
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Transparency plays the role of a regulator in doing business (World Bank 2020). In term of 
governmentality organized practices of government, transparency can be argued as a technical 
rationality(Foucault 2007)., which is concerned with achieving goals, such as improving the 
economy (Alvesson 1996) The World Bank Ranking in doing business ranked the DRC 
183th. among 189 countries in the World Bank’s Doing business 2014 index (KPMG 2014, 
p:5). If transparency is used as an indicator to enhance business and attracted investors, then 
the DRC is not making visible progress based on the World Bank Doing Business. The E.I.T.I 
global standard implementation is supposed to strengthen member countries’ accountability 
and motivate investors. However, since the DRC’s index in performing business is weak, the 
impact of E.I.T.I can be questioned, so as the hope to reach target 16.10 of the UN SDGs. 
Another aspect of transparency that has been considered in this study is its effective ability to 
expand the distribution of assets. According to Foucault (2007), political rationality is 
supposed to help ensuring that the benefits of development are reallocated and not capture by 
the country’s elites (Bellver & Kaufman 2005). Nonetheless, the E.I.T.I international board 
has declared the DRC a country making progress in implementing E.I.T.I 2016 standard. An 
outcome of the progress made by the DRC is the reform of the mining code 2018. The new 
mining code provides new distribution of the mining royalty. It is expected that 50% of the 
fees will go to the central government, 25% will be allocated to the administration of the 
province, 15% to the Decentralized Territorial Entity (ETD) where the exploitation takes 
place and 10% to a mining fund for future generations (Smyth 2019). In the past, extractive 
companies paid royalties directly to central government responsible for transferring a share to 
the decentralized entities, but the transfer was rarely executed (Lassourd 2018). Less than 4-5 
ETDs received the royalties and royalties received mainly benefited the elites which for 
example spend money in expensive cars (ibid.). However, transparency can be questioned at 
this stage because it is unknown who controls the money and what the ETD would do with it.  
Local communities are concerned about not being included in decision making. Societies 
depend on healthy surroundings for their living. It is important to invest in communities, 
individuals and civil society organizations, and invite them to take part in the decision-making 
process. However, such transparency is absent in the DRC’s local communities. Civil 
societies are fighting to get in place a culture to implicate the local communities in the 
process. Therefore, we can say that the SDGs target 16.7 is far from being reached. Tenke 
Fungurume, Kipushi, Ruashi and Kolwezi communities interviewed during the fieldwork are 
equally concerned regarding the impacts of the extractives industries on their environment. 
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These communities deal with unproductive soil, water pollution (goal 6) and women giving 
birth to children with functional and cognitive disabilities.  
As the extractives sector holds enhancing transparency, interested party face challenges 
related to information spread, dissemination distribution, and cross-check. Get the better of 
these challenges is more vital than ever to guaranty effectiveness and reinforce current 
systems, avoid repetition, manage anticipations, support evidence-based decision-making and 
create shareholder trust (Deme, Jensen & Petersen 2016).  
Bac (2001) discussed the fact that transparency can be a valuable asset of connection that 
facilitated corruption. By being transparent, a window is opened between influential public 
officials and the world. Thus, a connection can use the window on his favour to build a 
connection for corruption (ibid). With this approach, it is a challenge to avoid corruption, 
especially if a high ranked public official uses his/her position to influence a decision. 
6.3 Accountability 
E.I.T.I stakeholders must report the revenues generated by the extractive sector, from the 
signing contract to exportation (E.I.T.I 2020). These reports play an accountability function 
and are considered a primary mechanism use to monitor improvement into the extractive 
sector (Katomero 2017). Accountability involves the obligation to explain and justify conduct 
to specific group (Schedler, Diamond & Plattner 1999 p.14). In the case of the extractive 
sector in the DRC, stakeholders are obligated to explain their conduct to audit agencies by 
disclosing taxes pay to the state and the state to disclose what they have received from 
industry. Audit mechanisms are understood here as a technology of government (Foucault 
2007) that permeate the extractive sector as important answers to specific types of moral 
hazards (Williamsons, 1991) and as a protection from the actions of stakeholders. Audits are 
expected to be a transparent way of measuring individual and organizational performance 
(Molnar and Warren 2020). They increase values of organizational transparency and enlighten 
accountability through mechanisms of self-reporting or external reporting and verification 
(Molnar and Warren 2020). An E.I.T.I/DRC report points out that a government agency 
received mining payments from extractive industries but did not deposit them to the Central 
Bank (CB). The fact that the payment wasn’t deposited in the right account increased the risks 
for mismanagement and embezzlement of revenues. The report revealed that $88 million in 
mining royalties collected was difficult to be found in the public treasure (E.I.T.I 2019). An 
audit agency was asked to investigate public officials in order to find the missing income. 
This situation tarnished the DRC’s accountability before E.I.T.I international, compromised 
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the country’s membership in the organization as well as the country’s SDGs. We can argue 
that audits are ways to protect against the moral hazard of extreme extractive industries 
activities (Molnar and Warren 2020). 
Transparency and accountability need to be keys parts of art of government (Foucault 2007, 
Dean 2009), insisting that the implementation of the global standard could be best to achieve 
development goals. 
If reporting accountability is a technique of governance that expresses the liberal political 
rationality of the E.I.T.I framework, it means that it valorises strategy for managing the 
extractive sector through the routine of audits. As such, it is important to consider how the 
reporting function is representative of the governance of natural resource through the 
implementation of the E.I.T.I. As a technique of governance, accountability did not improve 
the corruption behaviour within the extractive sector in the DRC (NRGI DRC 2020). In fact, 
the E.I.T.I international board is still concerned about the corruption and mismanagement of 
funds in the extractive sector in the DRC despite the fact that the country is making progress 
in implementing the initiative (E.I.T.I 2020). In fact, some of the world’s biggest extractive 
companies have been audited and accused for corruption such as the Persian Gulf, paying 
important role in Malaysian 1 MDB scandal (E.I.T.I 2019) this really put in question the 
efficiency of the E.I.T.I in eradicating corruption. Schedler, Diamond and Plattner (1999) 
discussed about two dimensions in accountability: answerability and enforcement 
measurement. Answerability is linked to questioning high ranked public officials about their 
management of public assets and taking corrective measures to remedy any harm done. It 
could be possible with this approach to avoid corruption if the government practice in 
managing the extractive sector includes the political strategy of enforcement measurement is 
case of unaccountability.  
6.4 Governance 
 Müller (2016) sees governance is a process that allows projects to achieve organizational 
objectives. According to the former DRC Prime Minister Augustin Matata Mponyo mapon, 
there are still efforts to be made in order to improve the good governance of natural resources 
in the DRC. Yet, the E.I.T.I/DRC has produced values such as having a better image of 
mining operators and their scope of activity such as:  
 managing, monitoring of revenues and budgetary process 
 transparency in the mining royalty and the release of contracts 
  attribution of rights and monitoring of contracts 
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  beneficial ownership of extractive companies, 
 social impacts of Extractive Industries 
 regular and credible declaration of cash flows by all of the companies identified to 
participate in the Initiative  
 regular and detailed declaration by all the national and provincial financial authorities.  
All these elements are likely to improve the governance of natural resources, if embedded in 
political organized rationalities (Müller & Rose 2008). The DRC possesses abundant natural 
resources but 72% of its population experiences multifaceted poverty (World Bank 2020). 
This obvious and shocking paradox can explain the perpetuation of bad governance that 
reigns within the institutions responsible for conducting policies. Governance rationality is the 
use of control and trust as mechanisms to achieve good governance (Dean 2010). To this end, 
governance combined with strong and progressive leadership can bring about positive 
transformations in the DRC (Former Prime minister DRC 2020). The DRC government need 
to ensure the quality of the institutions responsible for conducting policies by adopting 
transparency as a desirable feature (Former Prime minister DRC 2020) 
In their discussion of governmentality, Miller and Rose (2008) talked about the programmes 
of government as political rationalities of government. The programmes are means by which 
government actors look to shape and impact the lives of citizens (Müller & Rose 2008). In our 
case, the experiences of local communities cannot be explained by Müller and Rose (2008). 
Local communities interviewed in the study are complaining about the impact of extractive 
industries waste on the environment, absence of infrastructures, absence of public services, 
unemployment to name a few. The E.I.T.I/DRC, as a technology of government (Müller & 
Rose 2008), mobilized to deliver government programmes is limited within the DRC. 
Mechanisms and practices use by the E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat benefit mostly actors 
at the macro level (political leaders) and it is hard to assess their impacts on the local 
communities. 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
The thesis highlights the implementing the E.I.T.I. The study of the DRC case on 
implementing the E.I.T.I adheres to a large extent to existing research regarding how political 
rationalities can empower and drive the governance of extractive sector in poor countries rich 
in natural resources. The DRC membership in the E.I.T.I was a strong signal about the 
government's commitment to make the transparency of revenues from the extractive sector 
one of the major subjects of its policy choice but meeting this expectation related to the 
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positive implementation of the initiative remains a critical issue. There has been progress in 
implementing the E.I.T.I, in particular in the preparation and in the regular publication of 
E.I.T.I reconciliation reports; in the participation of civil society in public debate; and the 
establishment of a dialogue between the government, stakeholders from the extractive sector 
and civil society. However, the development outcomes in implementing the E.I.T.I have 
proved to be less as argued by several scholars (Lujala, Rustad & Le Billon 2017). The World 
Bank (2020) suggested that for effective development outcomes, local communities must 
actively participate at the onset of the in extractive industries’ operations. The industry should 
improve its infrastructures and generate employment, and a chance should be given to micro 
business to engage long-term sustainable development initiatives. Likewise, the E.I.T.I needs 
to be more inclusive and attentive to local needs.  
This study points out the limitations that accessing information has on adopting the E.I.T.I at 
the micro level. Local communities living around mining projects in the DRC receive very 
little information about the E.I.T.I objectives and potential impacts and benefits from the 
implementation (E.I.T.I/DRC 2020). A reason for this could be that, in line with findings by 
Foucault (2007), political rationality choice did not provide a useful way of understanding the 
governmental practice, therefore the E.I.T.I/DRC technical secretariat, National NGOs, and 
local international NGOs as apparatuses are facing challenges to inform local communities 
about the E.I.T.I. This study points out the importance of the transparency as a culture in 
order to reach the E.I.T.I/DRC’s development goals. Hypotheses that implementing the 
E.I.T.I can reduce corruption have been analysed by the scholars (Barrett & Okamura 2013) 
.Although E.I.T.I implementation is voluntary, the government was motivated to make 
commitments because tit sought to improve the country’s reputation with the international 
community. The DRC is ranked as a most corrupted country and to improve such reputation 
the DRC joined the E.I.T.I and uses the global standard as a governance tool to eradicate 
corruption within the extractive sector (David-Barrett & Okamura 2013). These findings 
strengthen the critique put forward by Foucault (1995) when we attempt to see the E.I.T.I as 
government rationality, practice the government uses to shape itself and to govern others. 
Foucault identifies the attempt as the conduct of conduct. In other words, the E.I.T.I 
implementation regulates actors’ thoughts and behaviours. The regulation of thoughts and 
behaviours vary at the macro level because transparency as a new culture will take time to 
change a society where corruption is a way to operate. It is interesting to note that while 
E.I.T.I appears to be an efficient tool for the governance of extractive sector in the DRC, there 
is resistance among stakeholders and it could be understood as a dependent on the corruption. 
The question remains whether the apparatuses comprised of the E.I.T.I/ DRC technical 
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secretariat, national NGOs, and local international NGOs should be expected to solve 
problems that are perceived to be driving corruption. In regard to this, an interesting prospect 
for further research would be to explore the level of political engagement amongst individuals 
and actors involved in E.I.T.I initiatives. 
The main aim of this study was to evaluate whether the adaptation and implementation of the 
E.I.T.I in DRC have improved transparency, accountability practices in its extractive sector 
governance as well as the management of revenues. Data obtained from the questionnaire 
(submitted to key informant) were qualitatively analysed. The results of the interviews were 
also qualitatively analysed in order to corroborate the findings from the questionnaire and to 
help provide insight into the subject of our enquiry. It also aided with understanding and 
making sense of how the analysis of interviews’ results were conducted. This study noticed 
that there was an inter-play of opinions between and among the key stakeholders indicating 
significant differences of perception about transparency and accountability practices in the 
DRC extractive sector governance. This was a result of their functional differences and 
relationships with the extractive sector. These findings will inform the Government on where 
to improve and on how best to use mining revenues for the good of DRC society and the 
country. The findings will also contribute knowledge and literature on the DRC mining 
industries in the area of extractive sector governance. 
How effective was the E.I.T.I execution in the extractive sector in the DRC? 
The DRC began implementing the E.I.T.I after a decade period of armed conflicts leading the 
country to social and economic failure (E.I.T.I 2019). The mining sector as an engine of 
growth became insolvent because of corruption, robbing, mineral smuggling and political 
instability (ibid.). Furthermore, over 63% of 70 million of the Congolese citizens live under 
the poverty line according to the World Bank (2020). It is in the setting, the government of 
the DRC decided to implement the EITI. A rational decision based on the belief that the 
global standard will enhance the engine of growth, reviving the extractive sector to improve 
the social economic aspect of the country. In 2005, the DRC join the EITI and eleven reports 
have been published by the E.I.T.I/DRC showing a stable increase in government incomes. 
(E.I.T.I 2019). For example USD 875 million in income comes from the mining sector in 
2010 and 82% of USD 1, 7 billion in 2015 come from mining sector, and 90% of USD 1, 13 
billion in 2016 came from the mining sector (E.I.T.I 2019).  
Additionally, the E.I.T.I has agreed on amplifies reporting payment to the artisanal and small-
scale mining and forestry sectors (E.I.T.I 2019). Furthermore, E.I.T.I/DRC contributed to the 
revision of the DRC mining code put out in 2018 including the royalties’ direct to 
communities living around mining sites (Ibid.). However, the understanding of the impact of 
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implementing the EITI among communities interviewed for this study living around the 
mining is almost inexistent. E.I.T.I: impact in relation to institution, the Ministry of Mines 
website make available links to over 140 contracts, together with detailed production and 
export figures for 2011-2018 (E.I.T.I 2019). The Ministry of Finances make available 
monthly revenues collected by the government from the extractive industries (ibid.). To sum 
up, this thesis has contributed to existing research on E.I.T.I implementation in poor countries 
rich in natural resources by pointing out that the failure of understanding the global standard 
objectives by stakeholder’s impact negatively it success. Furthermore, there is an unbalance 
of information sharing in the context of the DRC leading to the non-success of the initiative.  
8 Recommendations 
The E.I.T.I standard is an initiative implemented in 53 countries. It has shown success and 
challenges in the governance of the extractives sector especially in developing countries rich 
in natural resources. However, there are factors to take into consideration for the success and 
sustainability of the initiative since the initiative must take into consideration political, 
economic, climate and environmental attributes. Thus, analysing political, environmental 
climate and economic risks will be an efficient strategy to build a model for better 
management and control for each country. Figure 6 suggests variables to consider as 
prerequisite to enforce E.I.T.I implementation within the DRC. 
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Figure 6: Prerequisite to implement the E.I.T.I standard 
1. Set clear and measurable targets. An example can be find by following the below link 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAN.XQ 
2. Implement an efficient data collection system: consider adding a component on 
transparency in the existing DRC data collection system to be collected by independent 
institutions such as the Central Bank and National Institute of Statistics. 
3. Put together a review system: It has to be an inclusive system involving all institutions and 
stakeholders in the mining industry value chain.  
4. Setup a punishment/reward mechanism: It’s a mutual accountability framework where all 
stakeholders agree on punishment/reward with measurable benchmarks. Once a party to the 
mutual accountability framework falls below the agreed-on benchmark, the system triggers 
automatically the punishment/reward. 
62 
 
References 
Abdullah, A.; & Khadaroo, I. (2016). The governmentality and accountability of UK national  
museums and art galleries. Accounting Forum. Available at:  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.12.004[2020-07-31]. 
 
Alvesson, M. (1996). Communication, Power and Organization. illustrated, revised.Walter  
de Gruyter Available at: 
https://books.google.se/books/about/Communication_Power_and_Organizatio
n.html?id=UwGw9BFshrQC&redir_esc=y.[2020-07-31] 
 
 
Bac, M. (2001). Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply  
a Better Scene? Springer. Public Choice, Vol. 107, No. 1/2 (Apr. 2001), pp. 87-
96. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/30026256[2020-07-31] 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London,  
Routledge. 
 
Clausen, A.W (1981). Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. An Agenda for  
Action. The World Bank.Washington D.C. Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/702471468768312009/pdf/multi-
page.pdf. [2020-07-31] 
 
E.I.T.I (2020). Benefits from Implementing E.I.T.I. Available at:  
https://EITI.org/benefits[2020-07-31] 
 
Fenton Villar, P., & Papyrakis, E. (2017). Evaluating the impact of the Extractive Industries  
Transparency Initiative (E.I.T.I) on corruption in Zambia. The Extractive 
Industries and Society.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.01.009 
 
Chêne, M. (2017). Natural resource management transparency and governance. A  
literature review focusing on extractive industries. Available at:  
https://www.u4.no/publications/natural-resource-management-transparency-
and-governance.pdf[2020-05-15] 
 
Dean, M. (2010) Dean Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society 
(second ed), SAGE Publications Ltd., London, UK Google Scholar. Available 
at: 
https://www.academia.edu/3612626/Governmentality_power_and_rule_in_mo
dern_society_2nd_edn_[2020-07-31] 
 
Deme.O, Jensen.D, and,Petersen.I,(2016).Addressing the challenges of E.I.T.I  
mainstreaming: observations from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Available at:  
https://EITI.org/blog/addressing-challenges-of-EITI-mainstreaming-
observations-from-democratic-republic-of-congo [2020-08-16] 
 
E.I.T.I (2016).How the E.I.T.I contributes toward meeting the sustainable development  
goals.  
63 
 
Available at: https://EITI.org/document/how-EITI-contributes-towards-
meeting-sustainable-development-goals [2020-05-15 
 
E.I.T.I (2019). Discussion paper: The E.I.T.I’s Role in Fighting Corruption. Available at:  
https://EITI.org/files/documents/EITI_global_conference_discussion_paper_-
_EITIs_role_in_fighting_corruption_1.pdf [2020-05-15] 
 
E.I.T.I (2020). Who we are. Available at: https://EITI.org/who-we-are [2020-05-15] 
 
E.I.T.I (2020). The E.I.T.I Standard 2019. Available at:  
https://EITI.org/files/documents/EITI_standard2019_a4_en.pdf [2020-05-15] 
 
E.I.T.I. (2019). Funding. Available at: https://EITI.org/funding [2020-05-15] 
 
E.I.T.I (2020). History of the E.I.T.I Available at: https://EITI.org/history [2020-05-15] 
 
Foucault, M. (1977-1978). Security, territory, population: lectures at the collège de France,  
Palgrave MacmillanLondon. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. Pantheon Available at:  
https://monoskop.org/images/4/43/Foucault_Michel_Discipline_and_Punish_T
he_Birth_of_the_Prison_1977_1995.pdf 
 
Foucault, M. (1984) FOUCAULT. In: Huisman, D (ed.) Dictionnaire des philosophes. Paris:  
Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 942–944. Google Scholar 
 
Foucault, M. (1991a). Governmentality. In the Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds.Pp 87-104. Chicago: 
Universitty of Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. (2003a). “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1975–1976. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Gouldson,A. & Bebbington, J.(2007) .Corporations and the governance of environmental risk  
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 25 (2007), pp. 4-20 
https://doi.org/10.1068/c0614j 
 
Hoffman,A.J.(1999). Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the US  
chemical industry Academy of Management Journal, 42, pp. 351-371 
https://doi.org/10.5465/257008 
 
Inglis, D. & Christopher, T. 2019. An invitation to Social Theory. Cambridge. Polity 
Press 
 
International Monetary Fund (2016). The IMF and Good Governance. International Monetary  
Fund Factsheet. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/gov.pdf [2020-05-15] 
 
International Monetary Fund (2019). Democratic Republic of Congo and IMF Mission Reach  
64 
 
An Agreement ad-on Financial Assistance under the Rapid Credit Facility and a 
Staff-Monitored Program. Press release. No19/421. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2019). Democratic Republic of Congo. IMF Country Report  
No. 19/286.  
 
Japhace. & Constantine. (2015). Mineral Extraction for Socio-Economic  
Transformation of Tanzania: The Need to Move from Papers to Implementation 
of Mining Policy and Law. Journal of Social Science Studies. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/jsss.v2i2.7450 [2020-05-15] 
 
Japhace,P & Michael, K.H. (2018) Transparency initiatives and Tanzania’s  
extractive industry governance. Development Studies Research, 5:1, 106-121. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21665095.2018.1486219 
 
KPMG Global Mining Institute (2014). Democratic Republic of Congo. Country mining  
guide KPMG International. Available at: 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/09/democratic-republic-congo-
mining-guide.pdf [2020-05-15] 
 
Lassourd, T. (2018), La fiscalité du nouveau code minier de la République  
Démocratique du Congo, Natural Resource Governance Institute, Analyse, 
Novembre 2018.Available at : 
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/la-fiscalite-du-
nouveau-code-minier-de-la-republique-democratique-du-congo.pdf [2020-05-
15] 
 
Lujala,P. (2018). An analysis of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
Implementation process. World Development. Volume 107, July 2018, Pages 
358-381.Available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.02.030 
 
Malden, A. (2017). E.I.T.I membership boosts mineral exploration attractiveness.  
Available at:https://EITI.org/blog/EITI-membership-boosts-mineral-
exploration-attractiveness[2020-05-15] 
 
Maweje.J, (2019). Natural resources governance and tax revenue mobilization in sub saharan  
Africa: The role of E.I.T.I Resources Policy. Volume 62, Pages 176-183 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2019.04.001 
 
Molnar, A., & Warren, I. (2020). Governing Liberty Through Accountability: Surveillance 
Reporting as Technologies of Governmentality. Springer Nature B.V. Critical 
Criminology (2020) 28:13–26 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-020-09490-9 
 
Miller,P. & Rose,N. (1990)Governing economic life Economy and Society, 19 (1990), pp. 1- 
31 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03085149000000001 
 
Miller,P. & Rose,N. (2008). Governing the present: Administering economic, social and  
personal life Polity, Cambridge. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610374134 
 
65 
 
Müller, P, Pemsel, S., & Shao, J. (2016) Organizational Enablers for Project  
Governance Project Management Institute, Newton Square, PA, USA  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.03.007 
 
 
N. Rose,N & Miller, P.( 1992) Political power beyond the State: Problematics of Government  
The British Journal of Sociology, 43, pp. 173-205 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01247.x 
 
Ngoy, R (2003) La relance du Copperbelt africain. Un défi stratégique, communication  
Présentée lors des journées scientifiques de la Faculté de polytechnique. 
université de Lubumbashi. Available at: https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-
africaine-2004-1-page-21.htm#no10 [2020-05-15] 
 
O’Dwyer, B. (2003). Conceptions of corporate social responsibility: The nature of  
managerial capture Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 16 (2003), 
pp. 523-557 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513570310492290 
 
Oge, K., 2016. Which transparency matters? Compliance with anti-corruption 
efforts in extractive industries. Res. Policy 49, 41–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.04.001 
 
Polya Katsamunska (2016). The concepts of Governance Public Governance Theories  
Economic Alternatives Issue 2. Available at  
https://www.unwe.bg/uploads/Alternatives/Polya_1_br2_2016_en.pdf [2020-05-
09] 
Publish What you Pay (2002). Our history. Available at: https://www.pwyp.org/about/[2020- 
05-15] 
 
Razaq A. Adefulu (1991). African Debt Crisis and the IMF Adjustment Programmes: the  
Experiences of Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia. Development Perspectives for 
the1990s pp 37-57. Available at : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21630-7_3  
 
Rose, N., O’Malley, P., & Valverde, M. (2006). Governmentality. Annual Review of Law and  
Social Science,2, 83–104. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228159866_Governmentality 
 
 
Rustad, S. A., Le Billon, P., & Lujala, P. (2017). Has the Extractive Industries Transparency  
Initiative been a success? Identifying and evaluating E.I.T.I goals. Resources 
Policy, 51, 151–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.12.004 
 
Sachs, J. D. & Andrew, M. W. (1999). The big push, natural resource booms and growth. 
Journal of Development Economics Volume 59, Issue 1, June 1999, Pages 43-
76.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00005-X 
 
Shari, B. & Barrie, H. (2007). Transparency and Accountability In Africa’s Extractive  
Industries: The Role of The Legislature. National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI). Available at: 
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/2191_extractive_080807.pdf [2020-05-
15] 
66 
 
 
Sovacool. B, K & Andrews.N (2015). Does transparency matter? Evaluating the governance  
impacts of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (E.I.T.I) in 
Azerbaijan and Liberia.Resources Policy Volume 45, September 2015, Pages 
183-192 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2015.04.003 
 
Spence, J. L. & Rinaldi, L. (2014). Governmentality in accounting and accountability: A case  
study of embedding sustainability in a supply chain. Accounting,Organizations 
and SocietyVolume 39, Issue 6, August 2014, Pages 433-452 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.03.003 
 
Transparency International (2019). Democratic Republic of the Congo. corruption  
perceptions index 2019). Available at 
https://www.transparency.org/country/COD [2020-05-15] 
 
 
World Bank. (2016). Annual report 2015. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  
Multi-Donor Trust Fund (E.I.T.I-MDTF). Retrieved from Washington, 
D.C. Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604341468196752604/pdf/ 
103382-AR-E.I.T.I-MDTF-Annual-Report-FY15-FINAL-PUBLIC.pdf [2020-
05-15] 
 
World Bank (1992). Governance and Development. A World Bank Publications. Available at:  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604951468739447676/pdf/multi-
page.pdf [2020-05-15] 
World Bank (2019). The world Bank in DRC. Overview. Available at:  
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview [2020-05-15] 
 
World Bank (2020). Extractive Industries. Overview. available at:  
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/overview#2.[2020-
07-31] 
 
Annexe 1: E.I.T.I Principles 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts. 
2.  We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s 
citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interests of 
their national development. 
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over 
many years and can be highly price dependent. 
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4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure 
over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic 
options for sustainable development. 
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the 
extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and 
accountability. 
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of 
respect for contracts and laws. 
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment 
that financial transparency may bring. 
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all 
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure. 
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability in 
public life, government operations and in business. 
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of 
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use. 
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive 
industry companies operating in that country. 
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant 
contributions to make ‑ including governments and their agencies, extractive industry 
companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations, 
investors and non‑governmental organisations. https://eiti.org/document/eiti-principles 
2020-08-19] 
 
Annexe 2: Sustainable development goals related to E.I.T.I 
The 17 SDGs are all interconnected, depend upon and affect each other. This research links 
on to many of the global goals, for the fulfilment of SDG (E.I.T.I, 2016). 
1. No poverty: Target 1.1 by 2030; eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, 
currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day. 
2. Economy growth: Target 10b Encourage … financial flows, including foreign direct 
investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular, least developed countries, 
African countries, Small Island developing States and landlocked developing countries, 
following their national plans and programs. 
3. No. crime: Target 16.4 By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial … flows, … and 
combat all forms of organized crime and 
4. No corruption: Target 16.5 substantially reduces corruption and bribery in all its forms. 
5. Transparency: Target 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all 
levels. 
68 
 
Participatory in decision making: Target 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and 
representative decision-making at all levels. 
7. Access to information Target 16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect 
fundamental freedoms, under national legislation and international agreements. 
8. Local right: Target 17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through 
international support to developing countries to improve domestic capacity for tax and other 
revenue collection. 
9. Civil society (local community): Target 17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, 
public-private, and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing 
strategies of partnerships. 
10. Accountability: Target 17.18 by 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing 
countries, including for LDCs and SIDS, to increase significantly the availability of high-
quality, timely and reliable data. https://eiti.org/progress-report-2017/eiti-contribution-to-
sustainable-development-goals [2020-08-19] 
 
Annexe 3: Questions to Government key informants 
1. "The publication of E.I.T.I reports is of great importance for the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo because they report on progress made in the governance of the extractive 
industries and public finances in the country. These Reports confirm the position of 
the DRC in the rating of organizations and rating agencies "this is a quote from you 
Excellence. Does your opinion stay the same? 
2. What do you think of the impact of the implementation of the E.I.T.I in the DRC? 
3. What has most impacted the E.I.T.I at the institutional level in the governance of 
natural resources? 
4. According to studies by some authors, using interrupted time series and panel data 
analysis; this research demonstrated the E.I.T.I immediately improved the overall 
disclosure of aggregated data in member countries during this period (2006-2013). 
The document also shows that perceptions of corruption have not changed. What 
about the DRC as for this? 
5. What do you think of this observation? You will vote laws ... do you not think that this 
standard can become national. So that it becomes binding. Integrate it into the national 
system, let it become a way of life 
6.  One of the main impacts of the abundance of natural resources is the creation of 
excess income above normal profits, or rents. Can you give me your point of view on 
this reflection by considering the case of the DRC? 
7. Do you think that transparency is easier to implement than democratization? 
8. Is the DRC democratic? 
9. Can transparency be applied in policy making to policy outcomes, institutions and 
various forms of information flow? 
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10. What do you think the impact of transparency on corruption in the DRC is? 
11. Which transparency can be equipped to address the problem of corruption in the 
DRC? 
12. Is the DRC public aware of this right to hold politicians accountable for their actions? 
 
Annexe 4: Questions to Extractive Industries 
Analysis on the impact of the implementation of the E.I.T.I standard in the DRC 
The questions are divided into three themes: Policies and strategies; Transparency and Truth ’ 
Governance and institution 
Policies and strategies 
- What does E.I.T.I represent for you? 
- What image do you have of the DRC politically now that the extraction of natural resources 
is done according to the E.I.T.I standard? 
- Do you feel secure in terms of investment? 
- Is there a factor that you can change in the implementation of the E.I.T.I? If so, what and 
why? 
 
Transparency and trust 
- Is it too much to ask you to be transparent in your statements? 
- Take the time to take a look at what the government says it got from you? 
- What is your contribution in the development of the community living around extractive 
companies? 
 
Governance and Institution 
- The DRC revised its mining code in March 2018. Do you have a constructive criticism of 
this revision? 
- Is this practical tool that the technical secretariat of E.I.T.I uses to collect information from 
you?  
- What do you think of the ways and means that the institutions in place use to collect the 
taxes that you owe to the state? 
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Annexe 5: Questions to communities 
Policy and strategy 
1. Have you ever heard of E.I.T.I? If so, how do you understand / understand its mission to 
publish what the extractive companies pay to the state and what the state says it has 
perceived? 
2. Do you have any idea of the impact of revenues from the extractive industries on your daily 
life? 
Transparency and truth 
3. Is the transparency defined by the E.I.T.I important to you as a community? Do you have 
access to information published by the government through the technical secretariat? Do you 
trust the disclosure of information? 
4. Do you know exactly how much money was spent on the mine in your community, what 
went into the district coffers and what was it spent on? 
Governance and institution 
5. Do you think the government is taking responsibility for the information disclosed by the 
E.I.T.I technical secretariat? 
6. What about the debates organized by civil society to hold the government to account and 
ensure that the revenues are used transparently for the benefit of the population 
 
 
Table 4: Stakeholders answers on Governance and Institution  
Theme: Governance and institution 
 
Questions 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholders’ 
Did the 
implementation of 
the E.I.T.I standard 
reveal anything 
particular to you in 
the way you govern 
your business? 
What has most 
impacted the E.I.T.I 
at the institutional 
level in the 
governance of 
natural resources? 
Can the E.I.T.I standard 
do more than its limits 
established by the 
international secretariat 
toward governance and 
local institutions 
Government (former 
Prime minister, Finance 
minister, mining 
minister, revenue 
department, former 
prime minister senior 
advisor 
-The E.I.T.I initiative 
can in a way be a 
fraud prevention 
tool. It is therefore 
important that, after 
finding the 
inconsistencies in 
revenues the 
government take 
appropriate 
measures to allow 
this initiative to fully 
contribute to the 
reduction of 
corruption in the 
DRC. This requires 
The E.I.T.I initiative 
has produced values 
such as having a 
better photocopy of 
mining operators 
and their scope in 
the DRC,  
management, 
monitoring of 
revenues and the 
budget process, 
transparency in the 
mining royalty and 
the disclosure of 
contracts, 
attribution of rights 
This initiative is limited 
only to the 
reconciliation between 
the declarations of the 
extractive companies 
and the receipts 
recorded at the level of 
the financial agencies. 
In other words, this 
initiative provides the 
State with a certain 
amount of information 
enabling it to carry out 
appropriate monitoring 
and control. 
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good governance 
coupled with 
enlightened 
leadership and 
improving the 
quality of 
institutions. 
Good governance 
and strong 
leadership at the top 
of the state would 
allow better use of 
information from 
E.I.T.I publications, 
appropriate 
monitoring and 
control of revenue 
collected and a 
significant reduction 
in corruption in the 
DRC.we have 
problem  
 
-When it comes to 
passing laws, the 
DRC has an array of 
laws that 
incorporate relevant 
provisions, which if 
implemented, can 
make a difference. 
The problem lies in 
the implementation 
and monitoring of 
these provisions. 
 
-governance 
combined with 
strong and 
enlightened 
leadership can bring 
positive 
transformations in 
the DRC. 
 
-The DRC is in the 
process of 
democratization. The 
country’s situation 
has evolved 
positively in some 
and monitoring of 
contracts, beneficial 
ownership of 
extractive 
companies, social 
impacts of 
Extractive 
Industries, regular 
and credible 
declaration of 
financial flows by all 
of the companies 
identified to 
participate in the 
Initiative as well as 
the regular and 
detailed declaration 
by all of the national 
and provincial 
financial authorities 
corruption is still 
present, and we 
recognize it in the 
differences in 
revenues declared 
by companies and 
revenues that the 
state claims to have 
received 
 
Cannot play a coercive 
role. one cannot remove 
the neutral character. 
let the executive take 
over 
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aspects and for 
others, further 
efforts are needed to 
make the DRC a 
country that meets 
basic standards of 
democracy. Once 
again good 
governance coupled 
with enlightened 
leadership can allow 
the country to 
improve, over time, 
its position in 
matters of 
democracy 
The problem of data 
communication is 
still present between 
stakeholders. 
-Good governance 
coupled with strong 
and informed 
leadership can allow 
the DRC to reverse 
the trend: the 
resource curse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extractive Industries: 
Ruashi mining, 
Mutanda mining, 
MMG, ivanhoe mining 
-State-owned 
enterprises are also 
required to report on 
sales of raw 
materials - the initial 
step in the 
distribution chain 
and the starting 
point for this trade. 
Before, only 
publication and 
comparison of 
payment flows 
between extractive 
companies and 
countries with raw 
materials counted. 
today, the standard 
embraces the 
governance of the 
entire commodity 
sector. It prescribes 
to describe the 
procedures of 
granting of license, 
the fiscal regimes as 
well as the use of the 
mineral resources, 
and to publish the 
exploitation licenses 
and the prospecting 
rights. 
 
 
Civil societies  Public debate - the government must 
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(NGOs: NRGI, PWYP, 
World vision Asemir, 
the carter center  
communities: ruashi, 
kipushi, Tenke 
fungurume, kolwezi  
-local population 
and government 
members need 
Capacity building 
regarding 
transparency 
live up to its 
responsibilities for the 
future of E.I.T.I 
-the E.I.T.I must 
collaborate with 
communities and 
companies for the best 
transparency to avoid 
the change of 
information 
-local E.I.T.I offices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.I.T.I/DRC technical 
Secretariat  
Means are limited to 
bring information to 
the base. 
The technical 
secretariat has 
enabled us to deal 
with an illiterate 
population which 
allows us to rethink 
the way in which we 
have to disseminate. 
target students for 
the successful 
implementation of 
the standard 
 
 have a coercive force 
bringing E.I.T.I into the 
political government 
system 
 
Table 5: Stakeholders answers on transparency and trust 
Theme transparency and trust  
Questions 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholders 
Is transparency in the 
extractive industries 
important to you? Can 
you elaborate how 
important? 
Can transparency 
enhance trust among 
stakeholders? Can you 
trust the information 
publish by stakeholders 
through E.I.T.I/DRC? 
How does the 
E.I.T.I/DRC 
impact the 
implementation 
of transparency 
and trust among 
stakeholders? 
Government(former 
Prime minister, 
Finance minister, 
mining minister, 
revenue 
department, former 
prime minister, 
senior advisor 
-Transparency applies in 
policy making, political 
results, institutions and 
various forms of 
information. 
-Transparency in public 
revenue from the 
extractive sectors.is the 
most important thing 
because E.I.T.I has that 
Trust eases the 
traceability of public 
revenue because we 
need it for the 
reliability of the 
revenue chain. 
Trust is not an issue, 
but the weakness of the 
law stands in the way 
to trigger it. 
However, it 
should be 
highlighted that 
the E.I.T.I has 
contributed to the 
improvement of 
transparency in 
the sector of 
extractive 
companies in the 
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claim to guarantee 
traceability of public 
resources: from 
extractive sector 
corruption erodes public 
resources and - - 
-transparency helps limit 
the growth of corruption 
Tools and mechanisms 
use for transparency 
need to be improved. 
However the steps in 
publishing information 
can be count in 
something because it is a 
new way of acting. 
Transparency is use as a 
corruption index. So it is 
important toward citizens 
to be transparent, also 
when practising 
transparency 
internationally it is good 
for the reputation of our 
institutions because it is 
weak 
-The E.I.T.I is struggling 
to embed in the 
governance of the 
extractive sector 
ingredients that should 
feed the culture of 
transparency and free 
debates between 
stakeholders.  
This culture of 
transparency and 
democratic debate is 
gradually gaining 
ground, even if there is 
still too much resistance 
that prevents the E.I.T.I 
from leading to profound 
changes in policies in the 
extractive sector. 
There is opacity in the 
extractive sector and 
transparency is not well 
understood and is poorly 
communicated. 
Numbers are not always 
consistent and the 
Have to trust data 
publish by the 
E.I.T.I/DRC it is 
important to country 
reputation. 
 
By inviting auditing 
companies such as 
Price, KPMG we feel 
the reliability on the 
side of private 
companies. on the side 
of public enterprises, a 
structure which 
collects data 
established by the 
Ministry of Finance 
sense that it 
allows a 
reconciliation 
between the 
payment 
declarations of 
these companies 
and the revenues 
made by the 
companies. 
financial 
management. 
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E.I.T.I/DRC double cross 
numbers publish by the 
state versus extractive 
industries 
 
The fact that the media 
constitute the privileged 
channel of 
communication of the 
State, it is not possible to 
apply institutional 
transparency without 
openness of the media. 
Also, the reliability of the 
aggregated data 
disclosed by the 
government is a function 
of the level of individual 
transparency of the 
institutions working on 
behalf of the State, so the 
three aspects of 
transparency mentioned 
are correlated and it is 
not possible to privilege 
the 'one aspect to the 
detriment of the others in 
the context of the DRC 
and even in other 
countries. 
Extractive 
Industries: Ruashi 
mining, Mutanda 
mining, MMG, 
ivanhoe mining 
Transparency in the 
corporate social 
responsibilities (CSR) 
(building school, hospital 
etc…).  
No transparency in 
revenues to the public 
account  
Transparency good for 
taxation, traceability  
Do trust institution, do 
trust E.I.T.I/DRC 
publish reports 
because the technical 
secretariat do find 
differences in reporting 
information between 
government and 
extractives industries 
revenues and point it 
out (Reconciliation) 
 
Publish data 
regarding what 
we declare to the 
state  
As investor we 
feel secured and 
our sales 
reassure 
everyone 
E.I.T.I/DRC 
helps when we 
have to declare  
Less hassle when 
we have to 
declare  
Civil societies 
(NGOs: NRGI, 
PWYP, World 
vision Asemir the 
carter center  
Communities: 
ruashi, kipushi, 
Transparency is a 
political will. Absence of 
will hinder the 
implementation of 
transparency 
Many authorities are 
implicated in the process  
The itie norm is caught 
in a mechanism in the 
undemocratic political 
system of the country 
and which slows 
everything down. 
Which makes taking 
The DRC needs a 
reform engine to 
move towards 
this initiative. We 
do this through 
transparency, 
only 
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Tenke fungurume, 
kolwezi  
Many embezzlements of 
funds 
Capacity building is 
needed in order to 
understand transparency 
what is declared is not 
what must be declared 
Contract discussions are 
not done transparently 
!!! Transparency in the 
granting process is more 
important than the final 
document which is 
signed and published ???  
Publication is not 
transparency in itself. 
Upstream you need 
transparency, it is in the 
granting process that you 
have to watch. 
The ideology is ill-
founded  
we know that the 
Congolese state has had 
as much and we can ask 
the municipality and the 
government 
we can analyze and 
question the differences 
opacity in production. 
GECAMINES 
(Congolese commodity 
trading and mining 
company) is the owner 
and subcontracting 
gossips 
advantage of the itie 
standard complicated.  
Where there is no 
freedom of expression, 
and you make the 
information available 
to the citizen, what will 
he do with it? 
 
yes but there is 
information that is 
questionable, 
questioning reflects the 
complicity and 
asymmetry of the 
mining sector in the 
DRC 
questionable 
Iinformation that we do 
not believe in a 
comprehensive way 
that says reflects the 
failure of the state 
transparency 
should not be the 
only factor. First 
you have to think 
of itie as a 
standard like ISO 
etc ... That is to 
say, consider itie 
as a certain way 
of doing things, a 
certain way of 
disclosing 
information. 
There are several 
ways to disclose 
information, but 
itie would like to 
be a label on a 
certain way of 
exercising 
transparency, 
accountability in 
the extractive 
sector. The itie 
wants to be in 
countries more or 
less like a "Think 
Tank", like an 
institution, like a 
space like a 
platform 
E.I.T.I/DRC 
technical 
Secretariat  
since the implementation 
of the E.I.T.I in the DRC, 
the country publishes 
contracts for the 
exploitation of deposits 
and there is transparency 
in the granting process 
use a strong tool through 
transparency 
Transparency in term of 
creates dialogue between 
stakeholders. 
Initiate policy to 
divulgate information  
Dialogue creates trust 
between civil society 
and government. no 
information on how 
much the extractive 
sector represent at the 
level of the state budget 
. the reports publish 
information and civil 
society do trust these 
information 
E.I.T.I contribute 
to the 
improvement of 
mining code. 
clauses are more 
transparent 
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Table 6: Stakeholders answers on Politic and strategy 
Theme: politic and strategy 
 Questions  
 
 
 
Stakeholders 
What can be the impact 
of the E.I.T.I in the 
politic of the country? 
Environmental aspect 
How do you plan the 
management of the natural 
resources within the 
country? While taking into 
account the E.I.T.I norm! 
Can the E.I.T.I norm 
play a coercive role in 
the politic/strategy of 
the country 
Government( 
former Prime 
minister, Finance 
minister, mining 
minister, revenue 
department, former 
prime minister 
senior advisor 
-The E.I.T.I initiative 
has produced values 
such as having a better 
photocopy of mining 
operators and their 
scope in the DRC, 
management, 
monitoring of revenues 
and the budget process, 
transparency in the 
mining royalty and the 
disclosure of contracts, 
attribution of rights and 
monitoring of contracts, 
beneficial ownership of 
extractive companies, 
social impacts of 
Extractive Industries, 
regular and credible 
declaration of financial 
flows by all of the 
companies identified to 
participate in the 
Initiative as well as the 
regular and detailed 
declaration by all the 
national and provincial 
financial authorities. 
-The current growth model 
in the DRC, which depends 
on the extractive industries 
(with little transformation), 
is too fragile given that a 
slight downturn in economic 
activity can damage the 
whole economic structure of 
the country. 
-To make the most of 
natural resources, the DRC 
should put in place a new 
economic model that 
promotes industrialization 
and consequently integrates 
the blue economy and the 
green economy. 
-the E.I.T.I should 
keep the neutral 
character and let the 
executive take over 
  
Extractive 
Industries: 
Ruashi mining, 
Mutanda mining, 
MMG, ivanhoe 
mining 
E.I.T.I need to do 
beyond collecting 
information. 
get applications to properly 
archive information in the 
event of an audit 
no 
Civil societies 
(NGOs: NRGI, 
PWYP, the carter 
center ,World 
vision Asemir  
communities: 
ruashi, kipushi, 
Tenke fungurume, 
kolwezi  
-Law need to be 
reinforce 
opacity in licenses. 
-the state holds power 
and covers expatriates 
-existence of land 
grabbing 
-no job for local 
communities 
-pollution of the mining 
industry (La SOMICA). 
No reading culture -target 
leaders for capacity 
building- need of 
institutional reform- bring 
stakeholders together to 
discuss about the non-use of 
E.I.T.I information- need of 
democracyno capacity to 
generate income revenue-
state absent in some place 
impact extractives sector 
We should have a law 
to back the E.I.T.I, in 
case extractives 
industries or state 
avoid to declare 
Yes/ no 
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KAIPENG 
-health of affected 
women  
-malformed children 
- civil society limited to 
provide information  
-rejection site not 
protected until today 
-Settling pond; fish and 
people are affected  
 
-since 2011, the DRC 
has published a decree, 
in the disclosure policy, 
the mining code has 
been revised to the 
benefit of the provinces, 
and local communities, 
the petroleum code has 
also been revised.  
-Corrupted NGOs- land 
grabbing-CSR bad 
government-legislation 
no respected –no 
education-social 
injustice-tribalism-lack 
of political will- no job- 
no youth support poitic- 
don’t know their rights. 
After mine because 
environmental is 
destroy. Need to think 
about the future 
generation. 
- 
management.- 
E.I.T.I/DRC 
technical 
Secretariat  
We are not included in 
the political system. it is 
a wish 
 
continue in collecting 
information- collecting 
reliable information among 
institutions-dependence of 
the extractive sector on 
politics should change- 
artisanal cooperatives 
opacity-change of 
information in proposition- 
Wish of a law in the 
mining code in case of  
transparency 
obstructing to be 
punished 
E.I.T.I/DRC can 
activate this law to 
encourage companies 
to send or publish 
required information 
 
